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INTRODUCTION 
Accounts of the role and influence of feminism in international 
law and global governance from the 1990s onward have tended to 
vacillate between analyses of the marginalization of feminist 
perspectives1 and the narrative of “governance feminism,”2 the idea 
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1. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International 
Law through the UN Security Council, 32 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 97, 97–100, 118–21 (2010) 
[hereinafter Power and Danger] (noting that a common approach in many feminist analyses of 
international law and its institutions is to “tell a saga of ‘marginalisation’, ‘silencing’, and 
‘talking to ourselves’”). 
2. See Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal 
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary 
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that feminists and feminisms are wielding significant power in 
various areas of international law and institutional practice with a 
series of negative results.3 Such accounts have variously analyzed 
watershed moments in international law’s guarantees of women’s 
rights, such as protecting women in conflict, new anti-trafficking 
frameworks, and gender-sensitive developments in international 
criminal law, all of which occurred either just before or in the 
aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. The coincidence of 
this timing is particularly striking, yet the impact of a newly-changed 
and increasingly omnipotent national security environment4 on 
international law and institutions on women’s rights is remarkably 
																																																																																																																												
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 340 (2006) (“G[overnance] 
F[eminism] is, I think, an under-recognized but important fact of governance more generally in 
the early twenty-first century. I mean the term to refer to the incremental but by now quite 
noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power. It 
takes many forms, and some parts of feminism participate more effectively than others; some 
are not players at all. Feminists by no means have won everything they want—far from it—but 
neither are they helpless outsiders.”); see also JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND 
WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006) [hereinafter SPLIT DECISIONS] (providing an 
account of the power of feminism in the United States and globally); Janet Halley, Rape at 
Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive 
International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008–2009) [hereinafter Rape at Rome] 
(addressing the role of organized feminism in the development of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”), and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) during the 1990s). 
3. See, e.g., SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 31–35 (arguing feminism’s “bad faith” in 
refusing to acknowledge its investment in wielding power); Halley et al., supra note 2, at 341 
(describing the “successes” of “governance feminism” as embodying “very state-centered, top-
down, sovereigntist feminist rule preferences”).  
4. This Article addresses not only the immediate upswing in national security activities 
and architecture in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but is particularly concerned with the 
evolving and broadening national security frameworks that accompanied the adoption of the 
United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006 and onwards. See G.A. Res. 
60/288, at 1 (Sept. 20, 2006) (defining terrorism as “one of the most serious threats to 
international peace and security. . . .”); see also the Strategy’s review resolutions: G.A. Res. 
68/276 (June 24, 2014); G.A. Res. 66/282 (July 12, 2012); G.A. Res. 64/297 (Oct. 13, 2010); 
G.A. Res. 62/272 (Sept. 15, 2008). For the acknowledgement in feminist legal scholarship of 
the prevalence of counter-terrorism discourse and practice in national and global contexts, see, 
e.g., GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVES (Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES]; 
Vasuki Nesiah, Feminism as Counter-Terrorism: The Seduction of Power, in GENDER 
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, at 127, 
128 [hereinafter Feminism as Counter-Terrorism] (“The political and military scripts of 
counter-terrorism have dominated the world stage in the post-9/11 era.”); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, 
Situating Women in Counterterrorism Discourses: Undulating Masculinities and Luminal 
Femininities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2013) (“The events of September 11, 2001, brought 
a new urgency and vibrancy to state action in the realm of counterterrorism. . . .”). 
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under-theorized in existing feminist approaches to international law 
and human rights.5 While there have been some feminist legal 
analyses of States’ national security responses, these tend to cluster 
around 9/11 and its immediate aftermath, analyzing “hard security” 6 
actions such as the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq,7 and telling a 
																																																																																																																												
5.  See, e.g., Jayne C. Huckerby & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Introduction, in GENDER, 
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 4, at 1 (citations omitted) (“It is accepted feminist knowledge that the ‘War on Terror’ 
abounds with gendered narratives, illustrated, for example, in the post-9/11 era with the U.S. 
government and its allies launching a war in Afghanistan in part to ‘save’ Afghan women. 
However, the gender and human rights dimensions and impacts of counter-terrorism measures 
outside of this moment are largely undocumented and under-theorized.”); Ní Aoláin, supra 
note 4, at 1085 (citing another source) (“From a feminist perspective, it is notable that 
terrorism and counterterrorism have long been of marginal interest to mainstream feminist 
legal theorizing.”). 
6. Such “hard” security measures for the pursuit and apprehension of terrorists were the 
predominant focus of States in the aftermath of 9/11. See, e.g., UN Secretary-General, 
Activities of the United Nations System in Implementing the United Nations Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/68/841 (Apr. 14, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/68/841] (“While initially many Member States may have focused on their immediate need 
to combat and prevent terrorism by building critical capacities in law enforcement, 
investigation and prosecution. . . .”); see also Isaac Kfir, Security, Gender and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction: The Need for A “Woman Question” When Engaging in Reconstruction, 22 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 71, 84–87 (2012) (noting the rise of military security and militarization 
within the concept of “national security” in the post-World War II period). 
7.  For feminist legal analyses of international law and the events of 9/11 and their 
aftermath, see generally Dianne Otto, Remapping Crisis through a Feminist Lens, in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND 
COMPLIANCE 75, 78 (Sari Kouvo & Zoe Pearson eds., 2010) (outlining ways in which a “turn 
to crisis governance,” particularly with respect to 9/11, affects feminist engagements with 
international law); Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, Editorial Comment, Sex, Gender, 
and September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 600 (2002) (pointing to the absence of women’s voices 
in the events of 9/11 and their responses); Gina Heathcote, Feminist Reflections on the “End” 
of the War on Terror, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 277, 278, 296 (2010) (stressing that “international 
legal developments that acknowledged the relevance of feminist approaches and women’s 
participation during the 1990s were either sidelined by the global war against terrorism 
narrative or developed through the production of restrictive categories of female victim-status” 
and “[a]n important legacy of the ‘War on Terror’ is the affirmation of a gendered 
international law and a continuation of a model of international relations ignorant of its 
gendered underpinnings”); Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Unlikely Bedfellows: Feminist Theory 
and the War on Terror, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2009) (tracing the confluence 
between feminist theory that seeks accountability for the actions of private individuals and the 
legal response to terrorism); Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women’s Rights in the ‘War on 
Terrorism,’ 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 211 (2002) (tracing the invocation of women’s 
rights in Afghanistan as a justification for military intervention and its impacts); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of Conflict, 47 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2006) (identifying parallels between the actors and events of 9/11 and 
violence against women to highlight the asymmetry in the international community’s 
responses to each as further evidence of international law’s gender bias); Feminism as 
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story that is largely one of marginalization and militarization. Such 
accounts have not, with some limited exceptions, taken a long view 
on the aftermath of 9/11 nor kept apace with the more holistic 
approaches to countering terrorism and violent extremism that 
represent contemporary national security practice.8 Accounts of 
																																																																																																																												
Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4 (analyzing the overlap of the women, peace, and security, 
and national security agendas); Rachel Saloom, A Feminist Inquiry into International Law and 
International Relations, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 159, 172 (2006) (“Most security-
based theories of international law and international relations are gender blind. Specifically, 
gender is not taken into account when theorizing about security or about international law or 
international affairs in general.”); JAYNE HUCKERBY & LAMA FAKIH, CTR. FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND GLOB. JUSTICE, A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-
TERRORISM (2011), http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/locatinggender.pdf 
[hereinafter A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM] (analyzing 
the gender dimensions and gender impacts of US counter-terrorism policy from 2001 onward). 
For gender analysis of the differential impacts of post-9/11 measures on Muslim women as 
compared to Muslim men in the United States context, see Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive 
Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s Identity Performance in the Workplace, 20 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 9 (2014) (addressing how stereotypes of Muslim women, including “as 
terrorists, violent, and disloyal” affect their experience in the workplace); Sahar F. Aziz, From 
the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the Crosshairs of 
Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 195 (2012) (“Notwithstanding that 
the headscarved woman equally bears the brunt of the government’s harsh counterterrorism 
tactics and the public’s distrust of Muslims, her voice and perspectives are notably absent from 
the discourse”); Nadine Strossen, Freedom and Fear Post-9/11: Are We Again Fearing 
Witches and Burning Women?, 31 NOVA L. REV. 279 (2007) (detailing adverse post-9/11 
impacts on women, Muslim women wearing religious attire, and immigrant women workers). 
8. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4, Pillars I & IV, which particularly reflect the 
evolving recognition of the need for the adoption of wider and more “soft” approaches to 
countering terrorism that embody human rights considerations. For example, Pillar I of the UN 
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy requires a preventive approach to mitigate a range of 
human rights issues that can foster conditions conducive to terrorism, such as “prolonged 
unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and 
religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good 
governance. . . .” Id. Pillar I. The fourth pillar is an even more direct nod to those States and 
practitioners pushing for a human-right based approach as a fundamental premise in the fight 
against terrorism; it “reaffirm[s] that the promotion and protection of human rights for all and 
the rule of law is essential to all components of the Strategy, recogniz[es] that effective 
counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but 
complementary and mutually reinforcing, and stress[es] the need to promote and protect the 
rights of victims of terrorism. . . .” Id. Pillar IV. For feminist analyses of international law and 
its institutions extending beyond the immediate 9/11 moment see Jayne Huckerby, Gender, 
Counter-Terrorism and International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TERRORISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (Ben Saul ed., 2014); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The Relevance of the 
Women, Peace and Security Agenda to the War on Terror, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
(forthcoming 2016); Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4 (challenging the narrative 
of marginalization of feminism from national security and counter-terrorism discourses); A 
DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7 (analyzing the 
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“governance feminism,” similarly do not speak to questions of 
gender, law, and national security in the post-9/11 era. Instead, they 
predominantly address a large body of practice in feminist organizing 
on international law and institutions that took place primarily in the 
1990s9—especially with regard to successes of the feminist 
movement in establishing war crimes tribunals10—and therefore 
ahead of those events of 9/11 that subsequently indelibly altered the 
landscape of international law, its notions of sovereignty and human 
rights, and its traditional public/private divides.11 As a result, there is 
no sufficient feminist account of international law that goes beyond 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to scrutinize the gender dimensions 
and impacts of an evolving national security landscape that—
primarily through a new field of policy and activities known as 
countering violent extremism (“CVE”)12—increasingly seeks to 
incorporate “soft” approaches such as promotion of the rule of law, 
human rights, gender equality, and development, alongside traditional 
law enforcement, military, and intelligence responses.  
Accordingly, when feminist approaches to international law seek 
to diagnose and explain the current state of international law and 
																																																																																																																												
gender dimensions and gender impacts of US counter-terrorism policy, including the role of 
development assistance). 
9.  SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 32 (“The 1990s was the decade par excellence of 
the emergence of governance feminism.”); see also Halley et al., supra note 2.  
10. Halley et al., supra note 2, at 342–47, n.10 (describing governance feminism as it 
manifested in relation to the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC processes). 
11. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World 
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 288 (2004) (noting the impact of the aftermath of 9/11 on 
recalibrating international law and its institutions, including through new manifestations of 
sovereignty as States operate through “government networks”). 
12. The holistic approach reflected in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006 
paved the way for this increasingly core aspect of States’ strategic approaches to violent 
extremism and terrorism. See G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4. There is no one universal 
definition or understanding of what constitutes CVE, but in general terms it is understood as 
having a preventive rather than post hoc orientation. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2178 ¶ 15 (Sept. 24, 
2014) (addressing “countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism”); 
Georgia Holmer, Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective, U.S. INST. OF 
PEACE, Sept. 2013, at 2 (“Counter violent extremism is a realm of policy, programs, and 
interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with 
radical political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups.”); Good Practices on 
Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent 
Extremism, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM 1 (2009) (“[CVE] initiatives tackle 
conditions conducive to radicalization into violent extremism with the ultimate aim of denying 
terrorist groups new supporters and recruits. The strategies and tools that governments and 
civil society organizations use to counter violent extremism vary, reflecting differing 
conditions and settings.”). 
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institutions on gender equality, they miss quite a fundamental piece of 
the relevant normative and political backdrop to such inquiries. In 
contrast to this lacuna in feminist international law approaches, 
feminist engagements in other fields—particularly in security studies, 
international relations, and human security—have richly 
problematized the meaning of security and the gendered components 
of national and international security practice.13 This Article is in part 
an exercise in catching feminist international law approaches up to 
these analyses, but it also seeks to generate new lines of feminist 
inquiry by engaging with the specific and hitherto unanswered 
question of how the omnipotent and evolving national security 
environment in the post-9/11 era, particularly as represented by 
contemporary CVE policy and practice, affects international law on 
gender equality and women’s human rights. Does such an account 
																																																																																																																												
13. See generally SUSAN FALUDI, THE TERROR DREAM: FEAR AND FANTASY IN POST-
9/11 AMERICA (2007) (using a historical perspective to amplify how the United States’ 
psychological response to 9/11 reified traditional images of women as fragile, victimized, and 
in need of protection by men); MARITA GRONNVOLL, MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF GENDER 
AND TORTURE POST-9/11 (2010) (examining gender and torture in media coverage post-9/11 
to draw attention to the preoccupation with, and construction of, female perpetrators of 
torture); Swati Parashar & Christine Sylvester, The Contemporary Mahabharata and the Many 
Draupadis: Bringing Gender to Critical Terrorism Studies, in CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES 
178 (Richard Jackson & Marie Breen Smyth, eds., 2009) (addressing the absence of women in 
State-centric discourses concerning terrorism); Swati Parashar, Women, Militancy, and 
Security: the South Asian Conundrum, in GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES 168 (Laura Sjoberg ed., 2009) (emphasizing the need for a gender perspective 
on addressing various aspects of terrorism and its response); WOMEN, GENDER, AND 
TERRORISM (Laura Sjoberg & Caron E. Gentry eds., 2011) (analyzing the complexities of 
women’s participation in terrorism); Aili Mari Tripp, Towards a Gender Perspective on 
Human Security and Violence, in GENDER, VIOLENCE AND HUMAN SECURITY 3, 13 (Aili Mari 
Tripp, Myra Marx Ferree & Christina Ewig eds., 2013) (noting the dangers of the 
incorporation of women’s needs in State-based national security and military measures); Eric 
M. Blanchard, Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security 
Theory, 28 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y, 1289, 1289 (2003) (“National security 
discourses are typically part of the elite world of masculine high politics.”); Heidi Hudson, 
‘Doing’ Security As Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the 
Politics of Human Security, 36 SECURITY DIALOGUE 155, 156, 165 (2005) (stating that 
“[g]ender is intrinsic to the subject matter and politics of security” and arguing with regard to 
post-9/11 effects that “security in one area depends on insecurity in another, as the ripple 
effects of homeland security measures after 9/11 are felt across the globe”); Jan Jindy Pettman, 
Feminist International Relations After 9/11, 10 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 85, 92 (2004) 
(demonstrating that the events of 9/11 and its aftermath have legitimated military action and 
revitalized traditional notions of masculinities and femininities and have “also disrupted and 
damaged the slow uneven moves towards the incorporation of some feminist concepts into 
international politics and policy making”); J. Ann Tickner, Feminist Perspectives on 9/11, 3 
INT’L STUD. PERSP. 333 (2002) (analyzing the post-9/11 moment through a gender lens).  
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point to feminist irrelevance, governance, or something else? To trace 
these evolutions in feminism and international law in the post-9/11 
era, Part I addresses the feminist legal responses to the “War on 
Terror,” or the global war against terrorism, particularly those offered 
in the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. I 
chart both the descriptive and predictive aspects of these accounts, 
identifying the range of feminist forecasts of what would happen to 
international law and institutions on women’s rights and gender 
equality in the aftermath of 9/11. I am particularly interested in what 
this review indicates about how feminist legal theorists and 
practitioners subsequently set their gender equality agendas of the 
next fourteen years, as well as how it affected their capacity to 
identify and address how an evolving and omnipotent national 
security context impacted the development of women’s rights during 
this period. While some fault-lines in feminist approaches in 
international law are identified in these analyses, their shared focus on 
the immediate post-9/11 moments and the militarized security 
responses that followed is marked. 
Against this backdrop, Part II analyzes feminism and 
international law in the long shadow of 9/11, addressing the long-term 
impacts of the immediate response to the events of 9/11, as well as 
those of this evolving and omnipotent national security landscape that 
increasingly mobilizes areas such as rule of law, human rights, and 
development—and indeed, sometimes women’s rights and gender 
equality—as part of holistic efforts to counter terrorism and violent 
extremism.14 This is a slightly different, though not entirely separate, 
project from applying a gender lens to analyze counter-terrorism and 
CVE, a task I have undertaken elsewhere.15 In other words, I am less 
concerned in this Article with only seeing counter-terrorism and CVE 
through the lens of gender, and more with seeing gender against the 
broader backdrop of the evolving and overarching context of counter-
terrorism and CVE, although the two exercises cannot be entirely 
separated and their inter-linkages are highlighted as necessary. This 
review particularly addresses the question of how contemporary 
																																																																																																																												
14. For those accounts of the gender, human rights, and legal aspects and implications of 
counter-terrorism that analyze beyond the immediate 9/11 moment, see generally Gender, 
Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8; Ní Aoláin, supra note 8; Feminism as 
Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4; JAYNE HUCKERBY, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOB. 
JUSTICE, WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE U.S. AND U.K. EXPERIENCES 
(2012); A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7. 
15. See generally Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8. 
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national security discourse and practice utilize concepts of gendered 
victimhood and vulnerability (e.g., women as victims of terrorism) in 
ways that compromise the transformative potential of international 
law for women. It also includes scrutiny of how a post-9/11 revival of 
international law’s formalism has affected the discipline’s capacity to 
develop gender equality norms and particularly reduced attention to 
State-based violations against women in the name of countering 
terrorism.  Additional normative impacts related to the conjoining of 
women’s rights (and women, peace, and security) and national 
security agendas, as well as the securitization and instrumentalization 
of women’s rights in national security law and practice, are also 
identified and analyzed as consequences of this broader national 
security landscape. In addition to these legal and normative questions, 
I also consider how, in practice, the contemporary terror/counter-
terror landscape has affected the possibilities for transnational and 
inclusive feminist organizing, as well as the success of other feminist 
methods for analyzing international law from a gender perspective.  
Across these areas of inquiry in Parts I and II, I pay particular 
attention to explicitly delineating which feminisms and which 
women’s rights are most implicated in, and by, national security and 
international law discourses. Indeed, this Article takes as a starting 
point that there is no one feminist account of international law and 
that these divergences in feminist approaches to terrorism, counter-
terrorism, and international law need to be so identified as they are 
instructive on which perspectives have ultimate analytic purchase in 
the choices that international law and its institutions make on how to 
recognize women’s rights and gender equality. While being mindful 
of these differences among feminist engagements with international 
law, Part II also seeks to provide a series of preliminary insights on 
how a framework for moving toward a more comprehensive feminist 
account(s) of international law and the impact of national security 
policy and practice might look. While the full development of this 
alternate framework—or perhaps frameworks—is beyond the scope 
of this Article, I argue that a feminist international law project that 
seeks to make women’s rights and gender equality concerns visible in 
the current national security context must address a series of macro 
and micro questions across at least the four areas of: women’s 
participation in terrorism and violent extremism; women’s roles in 
countering terrorism and violent extremism and the relationship 
between gender equality and national security more broadly; the 
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gendered effects of terrorism and violent extremism; and the impacts 
of countering terrorism and violent extremism on women, girls, and 
gender equality. Accordingly, Part II also contains reflections on 
these four aspects, as well as how each of these areas relate to each 
other, to pose future questions for feminist international law 
engagement with these issues.  
I. FEMINIST LEGAL CRITIQUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN 
THE POST-9/11 MOMENT 
Early feminist legal responses to the “War on Terror” correctly 
identified a number of incidents of gendered exclusion in the 
immediate post-9/11 reaction. Deploying the feminist method of 
searching for and mapping of “silences,”16 such accounts pointed to 
the fact that almost all notable actors involved in the perpetration of 
terrorism, as well as those involved in designing and implementing 
counter-terrorism measures, were male.17 Additionally, these legal 
analyses stressed the significant influence of a series of gendered, and 
often heavily racialized, narratives in the post-9/11 public debate and 
policy response.18 In such narratives, socially constructed categories 
																																																																																																																												
16. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity for 
Transformation, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 345, 347 (2002) (“Our project, as feminists, must 
in large part be to map the silences of international law, and fill those silences with our own 
voices.”); Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
379, 381 (1999) (“A methodology sometimes employed to question the objectivity of a 
discipline is that of detecting its silences.”); Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley 
Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 615 (1991) (“By 
taking women seriously and describing the silences and fundamentally skewed nature of 
international law, feminist theory can identify possibilities for change.”). 
17. Hilary Charlesworth, The Hidden Gender of International Law, 16 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 93, 98–100 (2002) [hereinafter Hidden Gender] (querying “What About Women?” 
and reflecting that “[a]n initial observation that can be made about the events of September 
11th and their aftermath is that women have not been featured in any way as involved in any of 
the crucial decisions”); Sex, Gender, and September 11, supra note 7, at 600 (posing the 
question “Sex: Where Are the Women?” and observing that “[a]s the events first unfolded, 
women were invisible, except as victims alongside men. Men made all of the crucial decisions 
involved in the hijackings and the responses to them. No women have been identified among 
the hijackers and their backers”); Kfir, supra note 6, at 84 (“9/11 highlighted how invisible 
women continue to be in times of national crises. . . .”); MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 3 (“On 
the perpetrators’ side, the atrocities were hardly sex- or gender-neutral.”). Similar observations 
were also made amongst feminist international relations and security studies scholars. See, 
e.g., Blanchard, supra note 13; Tickner, supra note 13, at 335 (“So where did all the women 
go?”). 
18.  Sex, Gender, and September 11, supra note 7, at 604 (“[S]ex has been a crucial 
aspect of the events of September 11 and the response to them. Men have been the major 
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of feminine and masculine were dominant and this typecasting 
supported the Western-led, hyper-masculinized responses (e.g., 
military action)19 as necessary to protect women as vulnerable victims 
of male, brown terrorists.20 The effect was also to produce a series of 
binaries that were at once decisive and divisive, encapsulated in the 
refrain of US President George W. Bush’s government (the ‟Bush 
Administration”): “Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists.”21 These feminist accounts also articulated how gendered 
approaches to the issue of terrorism were essentially reductive, 
belying the complexity of the causal events leading up to 9/11, as well 
as favoring short-term and militaristic responses that precluded more 
systemic, long-term approaches to countering terrorism, such as 
“fund[ing] sophisticated long-term education programs in the Middle 
East.”22 In such feminist readings, the immediate post-9/11 
environment that excluded women’s experiences and marginalized 
their participation in security institutions and decision-making, as 
well as the resort to masculinized, militarized, and State-centric 
responses, exemplified the very “male organizational and normative 
																																																																																																																												
players in all contexts and women have been cast as victims without real agency to affect the 
future.”); Hidden Gender, supra note 17, at 98–102 (tracing the mobilization of both feminized 
and masculine imagery in the response to the events of 9/11). 
19. See, e.g., Saloom, supra note 7, at 170-72 (identifying a number of ways in which the 
“masculinist culture of the military” manifests). For similar observations in feminist 
international relations approaches, see, e.g., Pettman, supra note 13, at 92 (identifying how the 
response to 9/11 “replayed the usual close associations of nationalism, war, and masculinity, 
and generated competing masculinities and stigmatized femininities”). 
20. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 296 (“[A]longside the limited narrative of 
terrorist actors as rogue male actors functioning outside the boundaries of the state, are images 
of women’s sexual vulnerability and need for protection. . . .”); Johnstone, supra note 7, at 44 
(“[T]he discourse of the ‘War on Terror’ itself revealed a perceived need for the state to define 
its masculinity in the aftermath of attack. This required painting men as heroes and women as 
victims.”). 
21. President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html. See also Hidden Gender, supra note 17, at 101 (“Another dichotomy that 
has been used a lot is, ‘You are either with us or against us.’ There is no middle ground.”); 
Pettman, supra note 13, at 92 (noting the events of 9/11 and its aftermath “activated bounded 
and binary international identity politics in which both women and gender played a central 
part, in representation and legitimation”). 
22.  Sex, Gender, and September 11, supra note 7, at 605; see also Katie Rose Guest 
Pryal, The Rhetoric of Sissy-Slogans: How Denigrating the Feminine Perpetuates the Terror 
Wars, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 503, 506 (2012) (“[T]he use of sissy-slogans. . . . have not 
only gained traction because of 9/11 and the ensuing terror wars, but have, in cyclical fashion, 
helped to perpetuate the terror wars by discursively shutting down potential for non-military 
action.”). 
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structure of the international legal system”23 that had been the focus 
of feminist international law scholars a decade earlier. The 
predominance in national security discourse of the Western narrative 
of “rescuing” Third World and Muslim women—at its most explicit 
in calls to invade Afghanistan in 2001 in part to liberate women 
suppressed by the Taliban24—also reflected “second-wave” feminist 
critiques that had argued that early feminist approaches to 
international law had unduly homogenized women’s experience and 
excluded women in the Global South, including by emphasizing their 
victimhood status.25 
For other feminist legal responses, these instances of exclusion 
and invisibility rose from the episodic to the meta, with the potential 
to disrupt and derail the project of gender equality under international 
law.26 Indeed, one core theme—either implicit or explicit—in many 
feminist accounts of the post-9/11 era is that of gain reversal, the idea 
that the aftermath of the events of 9/11 marked the beginning of a 
sustained peeling-back of feminist advances in international law and 
institutions, particularly those developed during the 1990s, which had 
seen significant achievements in a number of areas of pressing 
concern to feminist engagement in international law. The impact on 
																																																																																																																												
23.  Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 16, at 614. 
24. See Radio Address by Mrs. Bush (Nov. 17, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011117.html (identifying the intention of the address as 
being “to kick off a world-wide effort to focus on the brutality against women and children by 
the al-Qaida terrorist network and the regime it supports in Afghanistan, the Taliban”). 
25. See Kapur, supra note 7, at 214 (“[T]he ‘War on Terrorism’ and its secondary goal of 
protecting women has been addressed largely within the rhetoric of religion, civilization, and 
‘a just war,’ rather than a concern for women’s human rights. The focus on women’s concerns 
through the prism of religion and culture not only serves to cast Muslim women as ‘Other,’ it 
also serves to justify the liberating impulse of military intervention. . . .”); see also id. at 224 
(“Feminists in particular must pay heed to a history where such interventions have reinforced 
the assumptions of women in the postcolonial world as backward and as victims of a barbaric 
practice.”). See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelley Wright, Feminist 
Approaches to International Law: Reflections from Another Century, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 17, 27 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005) 
(“[A] major concern of those promoting women’s international human rights [is] avoiding 
essentialising women and recognising the diversity in the situations and priorities of women 
around the world.”); Brooks, supra note 16, at 353–54 (“‘Second phase’ critics note that even 
within elite Western feminist scholarly circles, one woman’s bread is another woman’s poison. 
Surely, then, it is a form of arrogance to insist that the world’s three billion women have a 
common perspective on such a highly problematized subject as ‘rights.’”); Feminist 
Approaches to International Law, supra note 16, at 618 (“An alternative, feminist analysis of 
international law must take account of the differing perspectives of First and Third World 
feminists.”).  
26. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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developments in promoting women’s participation in institutions, as 
well as on newly-enhanced normative protections in the area of 
women’s rights, were of particular concern.27 
To fully understand the nature of these concerns, it is necessary 
at this juncture to provide a snapshot of the improving state of 
international law on gender equality in the period leading up to the 
events of 9/11. Such progress included traction on the concept of 
women’s rights as human rights,28 particularly through a focus on 
gender-based violence;29 the adoption of the first international 
instrument—albeit a criminal law rather than human rights one—to 
address trafficking in persons, with a particular focus on women and 
children in 2000;30 and a series of developments in international 
criminal law, including the adoption of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court in 1998,31 which aimed to better address 
the experience of women in internal and international armed conflict. 
Significantly, only a year prior to 9/11, the women, peace, and 
security agenda was formally installed at the United Nations (UN) 
with the adoption of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 
(“UNSCR”) 1325 (“UNSCR 1325”).32 Recognizing that peace is 
“inextricably” linked with gender equality, the women, peace, and 
security policy framework embodied in UNSCR 1325 and subsequent 
resolutions33 provided a key and unprecedented international platform 
																																																																																																																												
27. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 297 (“A further consequence of the discourse 
on the global war against terrorism is the averting of attention from women’s rights and 
women’s participation at the international level.”). 
28. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, International Law from the Bottom Up: Fragmentation and 
Transformation, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 687, 700 (2013) (“Women’s rights became a focus of 
international law in the 1990s.”). 
29. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Ulrich, Confronting Gender-Based Violence with International 
Instruments: Is a Solution to the Pandemic Within Reach?, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
629, 629 (2000) (“Within the past two decades, international actors have devoted increasing 
attention to the crisis of gender-based violence.”). 
30. Protocol To Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 (entered into force Dec. 25, 
2003) [hereinafter UN Trafficking Protocol]. 
31. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 
17, 1998). 
32. S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000). 
33. See Press Release, Security Council, Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality 
between Women and Men Says Security Council, in International Women’s Day Statement, 
U.N. Press Release SC/6816 (Mar. 8, 2000) (“[T]he Security Council recognize that peace is 
inextricably linked with equality between women and men. . . . [and] that the equal access and 
full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the 
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for increased women’s participation at all levels of conflict 
prevention, mediation, rule of law, peacekeeping and peacebuilding; 
the protection of women and girls during armed conflict; and the 
prevention of gender-based violence.34 The adoption of UNSCR 1325 
was momentous and is particularly key for understanding the goals 
and configuration of much feminist organizing at the international 
level heading into the new century. Specifically, following sustained 
advocacy by feminist and human rights groups, UNSCR 1325 
“marked the arrival of . . . ‘International Conflict Feminism’ . . . as a 
player in global power politics,”35 where “international conflict 
feminism” is understood to encompass “feminist initiatives that are 
aimed at strengthening the international law and policy arena’s 
response to women’s experience of war through measures that expand 
recognition and redress for harms suffered, and increase inclusion of 
women in justice and peace measures addressing contexts of conflict 
and war.”36 As well as providing an entry point for the influence of 
this specific form of feminist organizing, UNSCR 1325 locked in the 
ongoing presence and influence of women, peace, and security actors 
in international, regional, and domestic forums, by providing “a focus 
for continuing engagement between the Council and women’s peace 
and human rights advocates.”37 
																																																																																																																												
prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace 
and security.”). See generally S.C. Res. 2242 (Oct. 13, 2015); S.C. Res. 2122 (Oct. 18, 2013); 
S.C. Res. 2106 (June 24, 2013); S.C. Res. 1960 (Dec. 16, 2010); S.C. Res. 1889 (Oct. 5, 
2009); S.C. Res. 1888 (Sept. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1820 (June 19, 2008); S.C. Res. 1325, supra 
note 32.  
34. See Dianne Otto, A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the 
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 116 
(2006) [hereinafter A Sign of “Weakness”?] (noting that the adoption of UNSCR 1325 
“promis[ed] new opportunities for entry into the ‘master’s house’”); see also Catherine 
O’Rourke, ‘Walk[ing] the Halls of Power’? Understanding Women’s Participation in 
International Peace and Security, 15 MELB. J. INT’L L. 128, 133 (2014) (“[T]he feminist 
emphasis on participation within existing institutions can be seen as part of a wider move from 
oppositional to more integrationist feminist strategies.”). 
35.  Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4, at 127. 
36. Id. at 142 n.2 (citation omitted). See generally Vasuki Nesiah, Uncomfortable 
Alliances: Women, Peace, and Security in Sri Lanka, in SOUTH ASIAN FEMINISMS 139 (Ania 
Loomba & Ritty A. Lukose eds., 2012) (addressing the impact of UNSCR 1325 and 
international conflict feminism in the context of Sri Lanka). 
37.  A Sign of “Weakness”?, supra note 34, at 116 (“Since its adoption, the Resolution 
has provided a focus for continuing engagement between the Council and women’s peace and 
human rights advocates. Remarkably, the Resolution has also become a grassroots tool for 
women’s peace advocates.”). 
546 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:533 
Although some feminist approaches were concerned with the 
fallout from the rise in prominence of national security practice in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11, others saw active opportunities for 
advancing women’s rights, or were at least worried about the risks of 
shutting down such opportunities. Governments’ efforts to justify pre-
emptive use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq as being in part to 
“save” women in particular provided validation for those feminists 
concerned primarily with “images of the female mother/child/victim 
requiring protection.”38 Other feminists also acquiesced when the 
Bush Administration increased its attention to women and 
international law questions by emphasizing the need to invade 
Afghanistan to rescue Afghani women from the Taliban and in its 
aggressive support for international action against sex trafficking.39 
Such feminist acquiescence existed even as the Administration 
framed both issues as also having a very clear nexus to its national 
security policy.40 Indeed, this appeal to international law and 
women’s rights and its viewing through a national security lens was 
not necessarily accidental; it had the effect of silencing normally 
critical voices such as feminists and liberal internationalists, who did 
not want to jeopardize losing what was perceived as a slender but 
critical window of opportunity to advance international law and 
																																																																																																																												
38. Heathcote, supra note 7, at 297; see also Farida Shaheed, The “War on Terror” and 
Women’s Rights: A Pakistan-Afghan Perspective, in LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT AND THE 
ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM 222 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2003) (“[U]sing the rallying cry 
of women’s oppression in Afghanistan in the opening chapter of the ‘war on terror’ hijacked 
the women’s rights discourse and conscripted it in the service of military actions, making a 
mockery of genuine women’s rights activism.”); Feminist Approaches to International Law: 
Reflections from Another Century, supra note 25, at 19 (examining how women’s rights 
function to detect terrorists and to legitimatize coercive state responses through “the 
identification of the enemy in the war on terror with repressive treatment of women and the 
development of the notion of a war for women’s rights”); Kapur, supra note 7, at 214. On the 
role of women’s rights in justifying humanitarian intervention, see generally Karen Engle, 
“Calling in the Troops”: The Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights, Human Rights, 
and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 217–26 (2007); Deborah M. 
Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 (2004) (tracing the ways in which humanitarian and human rights 
concerns justified colonization in US foreign policy). 
39. See Karen Engle, Liberal internationalism, feminism, and the suppression of 
critique: Contemporary approaches to global order in the United States, 46 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 
427, 427 (2005). 
40. See, e.g., Jayne C. Huckerby, Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, in GENDER, 
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 4, at 106 (tracing the trafficking-terror nexus and its impacts on the human rights of 
trafficked persons, especially women). 
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gender equality.41 Other feminist accounts were less sanguine in 
seeking to capitalize upon the opportunities presented by aggressive 
counter-terrorism responses that pursued non-State actors and looked 
eagerly to the might and magnitude of international law’s response to 
terrorism as a basis for generating strong responses to violence 
against women by private men.42 Such efforts also coincided with a 
set of feminist accounts that sought to define violations of women’s 
rights themselves as acts of terrorism.43 This early acquiescence—and 
in some cases outright support—of some feminist voices with 
counter-terrorism actions and discourse prefigured a more expansive 
conjoining of women’s rights under international law with national 
security objectives, which I address further below in Part II.44 
II. FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE LONG 
SHADOW OF 9/11 
A. The Role of Victimhood and Gendered Vulnerability 
One of the core concerns in some feminist approaches to 
international law has been how much its achievements—including 
particularly in the adoption of the women, peace, and security agenda, 
and the advancement of International Conflict Feminism—have 
																																																																																																																												
41. See Engle, supra note 39, at 430 (noting that the Bush Administration’s appeal to 
international law confined the parameters of discourse in the United States to the non-question 
of “are we for or against using international law to protect women’s rights?,” rather than more 
difficult questions about what this protection entails and why international law is mobilized in 
respect of some women’s rights issues and not others). 
42. See MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 19 (“What will it take for violence against women, 
this daily war, this terrorism against women as women that goes on every day worldwide, this 
everyday, group-based, systematic threat to and crime against the peace, to receive a response 
in the structure and practice of international law anything approximate to the level of focus and 
determination inspired by the September 11th attacks?”); see also id. at 28 (“This is not to 
argue that the war on terror is the right model for opposing violence against women. It is rather 
to expose, against the template of one reality of what men getting serious looks like, the 
commonalities between the problems they address and those they ignore, as well as what 
unites the solutions they implement and the problems they continue to fail to solve.”). 
43. Such approaches have tended to be developed in relation to the analysis of sexual 
violence, including in conflict settings. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: 
MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 209 (1975) (“[M]en who commit rape have served in effect as 
front-line masculine shock troops, terrorist guerrillas in the longest sustained battle the world 
has ever known.”); ROBIN MORGAN, THE DEMON LOVER: ON THE SEXUALITY OF 
TERRORISM (1989); Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former 
Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 
46 AM. U. L. REV. 793 (1997). 
44. See infra notes 136–173 and accompanying text. 
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“depended on an investment in women’s victimhood.”45 The 
particular concerns here are that such “hegemony of ‘victimhood’ as 
the framework for politics risks denying women’s agency and 
producing/reinforcing identity claims premised on injury,”46 and 
significantly, for the purposes of assessing feminist gains over the last 
fourteen years, limits the transformative potential of feminist 
strategies under international law.47 “Governance feminism” 
scholarship has similarly tended to emphasize how gendered notions 
of vulnerability are often “docked”48 in international law and 
institutions to the detriment of recognizing women’s various 
expressions of agency. This Section traces how these critiques have or 
have not manifested in the post-9/11 era by looking at how 
international law and policy have metabolized the following features 
of this omnipotent national security environment: the impact of 
terrorist violence on women and girls, as well as the active roles of 
women in both terrorism and its response.  
As a starting point, in practice, counter-terrorism and CVE 
policy regularly use images of women’s vulnerability and harm, 
including as a means to justify counter-terrorism actions.49 As 
mentioned above, this was starkly evinced early in the aftermath of 
9/11 with the effort to justify military intervention to “save” women 
as victims of the Taliban in Afghanistan.50 In the intervening years, 
however, the connection between women victims of terrorism and 
national security policy has become more nuanced and also more 
widespread. In particular, from 2006 onward, counter-terrorism and 
CVE policy contained a new focus on the need to combat the 
dehumanization of victims to prevent terrorism, as well as to, more 
																																																																																																																												
45. Vasuki Nesiah, Feminist Interventions: Human Rights, Armed Conflicts and 
International Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 67, 68 (2009); see also Feminist Methods 
in International Law, supra note 16, at 381 (“Women are not completely absent from the 
international legal order. . . . But, by and large, when women enter into focus at all in 
international law, they are viewed in a very limited way, often as victims, particularly as 
mothers, or potential mothers, in need of protection.”). 
46.  Nesiah, supra note 45, at 68. 
47. See id. 
48. See Halley et al., supra note 2, at 336; see also Rape at Rome, supra note 2, at 123 
(“[F]eminist universalism and its war-against-women understanding of conflicts . . . 
reproduces in reverse the blind-spotted moral vision that it contests. It is completely inattentive 
to the possibility that women have been the instigators or perpetrators of conflict.”). 
49. See Heathcote, supra note 7, at 296. For a similar observation on the 
instrumentalization of women as victims of terrorism, see Tickner, supra note 13, at 340-41. 
50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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broadly, make human rights an integral part of combating terrorism.51 
Both of these features of contemporary national security practice 
provided a crucial entry point for the uptake of those feminist 
perspectives focused on the gendered targeting of women and girls by 
terrorist and violent extremist groups and, in particular, on sexual 
violence.52 Accordingly, contemporary national security practice has 
shown an increasing concern with these gendered impacts of 
terrorism and violent extremism in a range of conflict and non-
conflict contexts,53 including by Al-Shabaab in Somalia54 and, most 
recently, by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in parts of Iraq 
and Syria.55 Gendered targeting of women in the north of Mali by 
“extremist Islamist groups;”56 the attack on Malala Yousafzai in 
Pakistan by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Swat, Pakistan;57 and 
																																																																																																																												
51. For example, Pillar I of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy requires a 
preventive approach to mitigate a range of human rights issues that can foster conditions 
conducive to terrorism, such as “prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human 
rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic 
marginalization and lack of good governance.” G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4, Pillar I; see 
also id. Pillar IV (on the promotion of human rights). 
52. For an example of an explanation for the use of sexual violence by terrorists and 
violent extremists, see, e.g., UN Secretary-General, Conflict-related Sexual Violence, ¶ 83, 
U.N. Doc. S/2015/203 (Mar. 23, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/2015/203] (observing patterns 
of sexual violence as perpetrated by violent extremists and concluding that such violence “is 
not incidental, but integrally linked with the strategic objectives, ideology and funding of 
extremist groups.”). 
53. See, e.g., UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Women and 
Peace and Security, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/2014/693 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
S/2014/693] (recognizing the targeted nature of terrorist and violent extremist attacks on 
women and girls as follows: “Other developments of concern include targeted violence and 
human rights violations linked to terrorism committed against women and girls. . . .”); id. ¶ 46 
(“As violent extremism continues to spread, there is growing recognition that women’s rights 
are under threat and that the role of women in countering terrorism and extremism is 
underutilized. . . . In societies with higher gender equality, extremism is less likely to take root 
and women are less vulnerable to its impacts.”). See also Good Practices on Women and 
Countering Violent Extremism, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, Good Practices #5, 
#21, #22 (2015) (the author was involved in the OSCE process that preceded this document). 
54. See Anne-Yolande Bilala, Women and Al-Shabab: Between False Empowerment and 
Terror, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/
regions/africa/252-women-and-al-shabab-between-false-empowerment-and-terror. 
55. See S.C. Res. 2169, preambular ¶ 13 (July 30, 2014); Haleh Esfandiari, ISIS’s 
Cruelty Toward Women Gets Scant Attention, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.
com/washwire/2014/09/02/isiss-cruelty-toward-women-gets-scant-attention/  
56. See UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, 
¶¶ 21–24, U.N. Doc. S/2012/894 (Nov. 28, 2012). 
57. See generally Malala Yousafzai, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/profile/
malala-yousafzai (last visited Dec. 15, 2015). 
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the kidnapping and abduction of women and girls by terrorist groups, 
including the abductions of Nigerian schoolgirls by Boko Haram58 
and of Yazidi women by ISIS,59 are also high-profile instances of 
targeting of women that have attracted international attention and, at 
times, been used to incentivize or justify an international response led 
by counter-terrorism actors. 
International law’s account of the impact of terrorist violence on 
women and girls, however, has often been problematic from a gender 
and human rights perspective. The first challenge is that it is often 
unduly focused on sexual violence.60 This has led to less attention to 
other gender-specific impacts of violent extremism and terrorism 
including, for example, restrictions on freedom of movement and 
dress, unequal distribution of aid and food, and banning or otherwise 
inhibiting access to education, particularly in areas under control of 
terrorist groups.61 This focus on hyper-vulnerability can also translate 
into a lack of precision regarding women’s experiences vis-à-vis 
terrorist groups. For example, while a rumor that ISIS had mandated 
female genital mutilation in Mosul, Iraq62 was quickly discredited, 
such false accusations skew protection and prevention efforts and 
hamper victims’ credibility in situations where victims often already 
have trouble being believed. This critique echoes that which is often 
made of the women, peace, and security agenda; that it unduly relies 
on notions of victimhood and vulnerability to promote women’s 
																																																																																																																												
58. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, New Kidnapping Reported in Nigeria as U.S. Offers Help, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014, at A1.  
59. See S.C. Res. 2199, preambular ¶ 14 (Feb. 12, 2015); Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe 
Systematic Rape, Yezidi Survivors in Need of Urgent Care, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 15, 
2015), http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/iraq-isis-escapees-describe-systematic-rape. 
60. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/2015/203, supra note 52, ¶ 82 (“The confluence of crises 
wrought by violent extremism has revealed a shocking trend of sexual violence employed as a 
tactic of terror by radical groups.”). 
61. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/2014/693, supra note 53, ¶ 46. See also RADHIKA 
COOMARASWAMY, PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE: 
A GLOBAL STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 1325, 223-25 (2015) [hereinafter PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING 
JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE] (the author contributed to the background of this study); Good 
Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good Practice #5.  
62. See Lucy Westcott, ISIS Denies UN Claim it Ordered Female Genital Mutilation in 
Mosul, NEWSWEEK (July 25, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/isis-deny-un-claim-theyre-
ordering-female-genital-mutilation-mosuls-women-261323. 
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protection under international law and by international institutions 
with a disproportionate focus on sexualized victimhood.63  
Second, an emphasis on women’s victimhood has undermined 
women’s roles as agents in post-9/11 global governance, including in 
the specific areas of terrorism and its prevention. Concerning the 
former issue of gender, terrorism, and violent extremism, 
contemporary national security practice regularly fails to address the 
role of gender identities and norms in the various drivers of 
“radicalization” of men—such as in terrorist propaganda that 
encourages women to foster violence by male family members and 
uses gender-based violations in counter-terrorism efforts (e.g., 
invasive screening of female passengers at airports) and norms around 
masculinity to inspire violent extremism and terrorism by men64—as 
well as the specific question of drivers for women’s participation in 
violent extremism.65 Instead, research and policy attention to the issue 
of women’s involvement in violent extremism, tends to unduly rely 
on the phenomenon of women suicide bombers66 and to flatten 
women’s motivations for participating in violent extremism or 
terrorism on the basis of gender stereotypes, such as the idea that 
women are inherently peaceful and involved as pawns or victims, or 
only join terrorist organizations to become “jihadi brides.”67 Such 
analyses belie the extent of women’s varied involvement, which in 
																																																																																																																												
63. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 298 (arguing that the women, peace, and 
security agenda as developed through the UN Security Council “links women’s peace and 
security with sexual vulnerability”); O’Rourke, supra note 34, at 134 (“In particular, there is 
concern that the WPS agenda has retrenched and institutionalised protective stereotypes of 
women as vulnerable, sexualised and inherently predisposed to peacemaking.”). But see Power 
and Danger, supra note 1, at 116–18 (tracing the role of “protective stereotypes of women” in 
the first four thematic resolutions on women, peace, and security and arguing that there has 
been some evolution from the initial emphasis on gendered vulnerability). 
64. See, e.g., Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 
53, Good Practices #2, #8; ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR., WOMEN AND TERRORIST 
RADICALIZATION: FINAL REPORT 3-4 (2013) [hereinafter WOMEN AND TERRORIST 
RADICALIZATION: FINAL REPORT]. 
65. One of the few and early references within the UN system to the need to apply a 
gender lens to “radicalization” is in Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-
Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM 
7–8 (2013) (“CVE programming should place a specific emphasis on youth at risk of 
radicalization and recruitment. . . . Program design should, where appropriate, take into 
account the different needs of young women versus young men.”). See also Good Practices on 
Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good Practices #2, #8, #9. 
66. WOMEN AND TERRORIST RADICALIZATION: FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, ¶ 7. 
67. See infra note 70 and accompanying text; Good Practices on Women and Countering 
Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good Practices #2, #8. 
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addition to roles as suicide bombers or fighters,68 includes 
participation as “sympathizers and mobilizers,”69 and in intelligence, 
recruitment, all-female brigades, and as legitimizers of state-building 
aspirations of terrorist groups.70  
On the question of women’s participation as agents in preventing 
or countering terrorism and violent extremism and the relationship 
between women’s rights and national security more broadly, the 
feminism and post-9/11 international law story becomes notably more 
complicated. Indeed, in somewhat of a contrast to the feminist 
narrative of the immediate post-9/11 moment—which identified 
women’s almost complete invisibility in decision-making71—one key 
consequence of a more recent move toward “soft” practices in 
countering terrorism and violent extremism has been an upswing in 
efforts to promote security initiatives that include women.72 
Reflecting an understanding of the failings of “hard,” coercive 
counter-terrorism efforts, current national security thinking often 
stresses that overt government presence or footprint in initiatives to 
																																																																																																																												
68. See, e.g., MIA BLOOM, BOMBSHELL: THE MANY FACES OF WOMEN TERRORISTS 
(2011). 
69. See, e.g., Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Rafia Barakat & Liat Shetret, The Roles Of 
Women In Terrorism, Conflict, And Violent Extremism: Lessons For The United Nations And 
International Actors, CENTER ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION 3 (2013), 
http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf. 
70. See, e.g., Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford & Ross Frenett, Becoming Mulan?: 
Female Western Migrants to ISIS, INST. FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE (2015), http://www.
strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.PDF; Erin Marie Saltman & 
Melanie Smith, ‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon, INST. FOR 
STRATEGIC DIALOGUE,  (2015), http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_
Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf; Jayne Huckerby, Opinion, When Women 
Become Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2015, at A27.  
71. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also infra note 75 and accompanying 
text. 
72. See Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8. For examples 
of these initiatives, see Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra 
note 53; Hearing on Women’s Education: Promoting Development, Countering Radicalism; 
Markup of H.R. 3583, Malala Yousafzai Scholarship Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014); WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE 
U.S. AND U.K. EXPERIENCES, supra note 14; Frank Van Lierde, Looking for That Other Face: 
Women Muslim Leaders and Violent Extremism in Indonesia, CORDAID (2013), http://www.
cordaid.org/media/publications/Cordaid_Other_Face_-LRtotaal_voor_web.pdf; ORG. FOR SEC. 
& COOPERATION IN EUR., PREVENTING TERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
AND RADICALIZATION THAT LEAD TO TERRORISM: A COMMUNITY-POLICING APPROACH 
142–45 (2014) [hereinafter PREVENTING TERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
AND RADICALIZATION THAT LEAD TO TERRORISM: A COMMUNITY-POLICING APPROACH]; 
WOMEN AND TERRORIST RADICALIZATION, supra note 64. 
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combat terrorism is counter-productive, and that instead such efforts 
should be lead more informally by non-governmental actors, such as 
community members, religious leaders, youth, and women.73 For 
example, recent instances of contemporary national security policies 
that seek to facilitate the roles of women include programs to bolster 
mothers’ capacity to address “radicalization;” promoting women’s 
access to secular and religious education to provide alternate 
narratives; support of women victims; supporting female family 
members of terrorists; reforming community-policing to engage 
women; and supporting women’s radio-listening clubs.74 
However, despite these theoretical openings presented by a 
move toward holistic approaches to countering terrorism and violent 
extremism, the involvement of women, feminisms, and feminists in 
this trajectory of national security practice and discourse over the past 
fifteen years has been both marginal and patchy,75 and remains deeply 
controversial.76 The “where are the women?”77 question, posed in 
early feminist accounts of women’s invisibility in the immediate 
aftermath of the events of 9/11, remains relevant as male actors still 
overwhelmingly dominate the policy and practice of counter-
terrorism and countering violent extremism.78 Much like with the 
women, peace, and security agenda, while there have been some 
efforts to promote gender-sensitive and inclusive national security 
policy, these tend to cluster at the informal or community level.79 
																																																																																																																												
73. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: The 
White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism 
[hereinafter Fact Sheet] (“The Federal Government’s most effective role in strengthening 
community partnerships and preventing violent extremism is as a facilitator, convener, and 
source of research and findings.”). 
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing initiatives). 
75. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 16, at 346 (“To the minimal extent that women have 
entered the male domain of international law and policy, they are often to be found clustered in 
its ‘softer’ corners, where you find the more ‘feminine,’ ‘human interest’ subjects such as 
refugee law and human rights law.”); Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1086 (“Men remain the 
primary and visible actors in terrorist acts and counterterrorism responses.”). 
76. See, e.g., PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, 
supra note 61, at 225-28; Ní Aoláin, supra note 4; infra notes 136-96 and accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., Sex, Gender, and September 11, supra note 7, at 600 (posing the question 
“Sex: Where Are the Women?”); Hidden Gender, supra note 17, at 98 (querying “[w]hat 
[a]bout [w]omen?” and reflecting that “[a]n initial observation that can be made about the 
events of September 11th and their aftermath is that women have not been featured in any way 
as involved in any of the crucial decisions.”). 
78. See sources cited supra note 17. 
79. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
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Prevention and response frameworks that emphasize women’s 
leadership in formal security institutions or promote gender-inclusive 
and responsive security sector reform are still largely lacking. 
Moreover, at the local level, governments’ efforts to counter violent 
extremism by and large have tended to involve formal, often male, 
“credible” community leaders to the exclusion of informal, and often 
female, leaders. Further gendered effects flow from this: in some 
cases, government support for such “credible voices” (including 
former extremists) has elevated voices in the community otherwise 
inimical to women’s rights concerns and feminist organizing.80 
Additionally, major international institutions addressing women’s 
rights protection have simply not been influential or consequential 
actors in the national security space. A stark illustration of this is the 
fact that UN Women (which came into existence in 2010) only 
recently joined the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task 
Force, which was established in 2005. 81    
Additionally, the rationale for such inclusion is often informed 
by—and deploys—a series of stereotypes that focus only on women’s 
roles in their “families and communities” or as victims of terrorism or 
as inherently “peaceful” actors who will mitigate rather than foster 
violent extremism and terrorism.82 Such stereotypes are redolent of 
																																																																																																																												
80. See A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 
7, at 27, 107–10. See also Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. 147, 214 (2014) (noting that community policing “interlocutors, most of whom 
are men, can further entrench their gatekeeper status,” such that “large segments of Muslim 
communities, particularly youth and women, could suffer an intra-community subordinating 
effect of being voiceless and bereft of individual agency.”).  
81. See Report of the UN Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/60/825 ¶ 3 (Apr. 27, 2006) 
(referencing the creation of CTITF in 2005 to “bring together key actors in the United Nations 
system and its partners dealing with counter-terrorism issues.”). 
82. See, e.g., Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 
53, Good Practices #3 (describing women’s “significant and varying roles,” but also noting 
“[a]s a core part of families and communities, women and girls have vital contributions”), #13, 
#15; Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools 
to Counter Violent Extremism, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that it is good practice for 
community engagement and community-oriented policing to “[e]ngage women as positive 
change agents in their communities,” because “women, especially mothers, carry authority 
within their families and communities which can translate into positive influence against 
violent extremism”); id. at 8-9 (stating that “women can be a particularly critical actor in local 
CVE efforts,” due to their role in their families, their knowledge of the local community, their 
position as “locally knowledgeable, credible, and resonant CVE voices,” their potential for 
identifying signs of radicalization and discouraging its occurrence, and their ability to serve as 
“force-multiplier[s]” to raise awareness of, and build capacity among, other local women to 
address radicalization); WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE U.S. AND U.K. 
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those of women in security discourse prior to the events of 9/11, 
particularly in the women, peace, and security agenda, which 
alongside images of women as sexualized and vulnerable victims, 
mobilized images of women as peaceful and maternal as the rationale 
for guaranteeing their participation in peace-building.83 Many 
feminist accounts of the post-9/11 moment similarly identified the 
influence of such ideas of gendered vulnerability and peacefulness in 
supporting coercive action.84 However, this conventional feminist 
understanding that gendered images of female vulnerability and male 
strength post-9/11 enabled only military action is shown to be untrue 
by a more comprehensive review of existing national security policy; 
these later, broader, and “soft” national security practices—e.g., 
empowering mothers to combat violent extremism in their 
communities, or as peacemakers in their communities, or as victims 
of terrorism who provide credible counter-narratives to terrorism85—
also mobilized and reinforced such gendered images of vulnerability, 
innocence and care. As such, this more recent account of 
contemporary counter-terrorism and CVE shows how such images did 
not shut down the potential for non-military action, but instead 
dovetailed with it in certain circumstances. 
Moreover, in many instances, the impetus for women’s inclusion 
has not been one of gender equality, but has been advanced by 
national security actors lacking a feminist perspective, but who 
remain committed to the belief that incorporating women in national 
security strategies—particularly in more localized and community-
oriented “soft” measures aimed at building resilience—improves the 
efficacy of these strategies.86 Such initiatives to include women tend 
to be premised on the rationale that women may have “different 
forms of influence” over their networks and that mainstreaming 
gender and the inclusion of women leads to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the causes of violent extremism, as well as more 
																																																																																																																												
EXPERIENCES, supra note 14, at 4–8 (tracing the rationales for incorporating a gender 
perspective in UK policies to prevent violent extremism). 
83. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 34, at 134; A Sign of “Weakness”?, supra note 34, at 
129 (noting that arguments by women’s peace advocates for women’s inclusion that utilize 
“biologically-based ‘maternal’ gender representation . . . may, unwittingly, authorize women’s 
continuing exclusion because they do not disrupt the gendered ideologies and practices that 
maintain it”). 
84. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 296-97. 
85. See supra notes 72, 82, and 162 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra notes 72, 82, and 162 and accompanying text. 
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“localized, credible, inclusive, resonant” strategies to build 
resilience.87 They rarely reflect the fact that women have a right to 
equality and non-discrimination in participating in all areas of 
decision-making, including those aimed at countering terrorism and 
violent extremism. Instead, often, the dominant framing is the notion 
that women should be empowered to counter terrorism and violent 
extremism, reflecting an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption 
that women are not already empowered, and that such empowerment 
should be on its very terms instrumentalist as a means to achieving a 
greater national security end rather than a goal in and of itself. Such 
framings provide a platform for gendered images of women’s 
vulnerability and detach the goals of women’s inclusion and gender 
mainstreaming from substantive equality agendas in ways that can 
make it difficult, without more, to read feminist success or 
achievement in their adoption. 
A third feature of the claims made about women’s victimhood 
within national security discourse and practice is that they can tend to 
be exclusive or hegemonic. This risks marginalizing the experience of 
other targets of violent extremists, such as gay men or religious 
minorities.88 It also can manifest in the claim that injury to men in 
counter-terrorism is less important than the experiences of women at 
the hands of terrorism (or counter-terrorism). Indeed, this risk has 
been one of the main critiques aimed at “governance feminism,” that 
the agenda has a distasteful appetite for tolerance of male suffering in 
pursuit of feminist agendas.89 In the post-9/11 era, some feminist 
perspectives have unfortunately been suggestive of this critique, in 
particular those that have explicitly opposed human rights 
organizations working with ex-Guantánamo Bay detainees to 
highlight abusive detention practices90 or to challenge targeted 
																																																																																																																												
87. See Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, 
Good Practice #3. See also Good Practice #4 (“Protect the human rights of women and girls, 
including their equality, non-discrimination, and equal participation, and ensure that CVE 
efforts do not stereotype or instrumentalize, women and girls”). See further supra notes 72, 82, 
and 162 and accompanying text. 
88. See, e.g., Hossam Bahgat, Explaining Egypt’s Targeting of Gays, MIDDLE EAST RES. 
& INFO. PROJECT (July 23, 2001), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072301. 
89. See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 33 (“Unless it [feminism] Takes a Break from 
itself, it can’t see injury to men”); Rape at Rome, supra note 2, at 123 (contesting governance 
feminism’s emphasis on women’s victimhood and noting that “[w]orse, it involves a—to me 
absolutely chilling—indifference to the suffering and death of men”). 
90. See generally Amna Akbar & Rupal Oza, “Muslim Fundamentalism” and Human 
Rights in an Age of Terror and Empire, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-
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killings91 on the basis that such human rights work undermines gender 
equality advocacy, including because it takes insufficient account of 
whether those whose rights are being defended themselves hold 
positions inimical to women’s rights. 
Finally, a post-9/11 account of women’s victimhood also tends 
to focus unduly on women’s experiences at the hands of non-State 
actors (terrorists), rather than to illuminate ways in which State 
counter-terrorism policies have also undermined women’s rights92 or 
to address a more complicated picture of victimhood whereby women 
often feel squeezed between terror and anti-terror.93 Examples of this 
squeezing effect include failure of asylum procedures to adequately 
recognize gender-based violations by terrorist groups as a ground of 
persecution; anti-terror cuts in aid, which are felt disproportionately 
by women and girls who are reliant on development assistance and 
instead then have to rely on violent extremists or terrorists to provide 
such assistance; and government restrictions in funding to women’s 
rights organizations working on the frontlines of the fight against 
violent extremism and terrorism, which may also have their activities 
chilled for fear of being charged with providing material support to 
banned entities.94 
																																																																																																																												
TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 152; Diana Hortsch, The 
Paradox of Partnership: Amnesty International, Responsible Advocacy, and NGO 
Accountability, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 119 (2010); Richard Kerbaj, Amnesty 
International is Damaged by Taliban Link, SUNDAY TIMES (Feb. 7, 2010), http://www.the
sundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article197042.ece (containing the original allegations 
of Gita Sahgal about Amnesty International’s relationship with Begg); Mindy Sawhney & 
Ravindran Daniel, Working With Others: An Independent Review, AMNESTY INT’L (2010), 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/partnership_review_2010_0.pdf (outlining the 
outcomes of the commissioned review of Sahgal’s concerns); Is Amnesty International 
Supporting a Jihadist?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=124156482. 
91. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Why I Spoke Out On Anwar al-Awlaki, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/19/human-
rights-usa. 
92. See infra notes 111–35 and accompanying text. 
93. UN Secretary-General, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
While Countering terrorism, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/64/211 (Aug. 3, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/64/211] (“Those subject to gender-based abuses are often caught between targeting by 
terrorist groups and the State’s counter-terrorism measures that may fail to prevent, 
investigate, prosecute or punish these acts and may also perpetrate new human rights 
violations with impunity.”). 
94. See, e.g., id. ¶ 42 (“The Special Rapporteur is also concerned that terrorism financing 
laws that restrict donations to non-profit organizations have particularly impacted 
organizations that promote gender equality, including women’s rights organizations.”); id. ¶ 50 
(“[F]orced domestic service for actors considered to be terrorists has been understood to count 
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While it is beyond the scope of this Article to fully develop an 
alternative gender and human rights framework(s) for addressing the 
complexities of women’s victimhood and agency in terrorism and its 
response, a few preliminary observations can be made. A feminist 
approach undoubtedly requires combating impunity for gender-based 
harms and terrorist targeting of women, but the key question is how to 
develop effective gender-sensitive prevention and response 
frameworks without unduly trading in images of women’s 
vulnerability and victimhood. Some measures that could be utilized to 
identify and address the full range of these impacts—beyond just a 
focus on sexual violence—include collecting “gender-disaggregated 
data on terrorist violence” and training security officials on how to 
recognize these various impacts of terrorism and to deliver gender and 
human rights-sensitive security services, as well as including women 
and women’s survivor networks in victim-assistance programs to 
address the full range of their protection needs.95 Moving past blanket 
portrayals of women as victims also includes addressing gendered 
grievances and other reasons that women and girls support violent 
extremist groups,96 as well as adopting the kinds of gender-sensitive 
disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs necessary 
for women and girls who may suffer gender-specific abuse both 
																																																																																																																												
as ‘material support’ to terrorism, therefore barring successful asylum claims by women who 
have suffered this abuse”); Lama Fakih, Soft Measures, Real Harm: Somalia and the US “War 
on Terror,” in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 183 (examining how US anti-terrorism financing policies have 
politicized and chilled humanitarian assistance in Somalia, reducing the assistance available 
for women and women’s rights organizations and resulting in reliance on groups that are 
detrimental to women’s rights); A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-
TERRORISM, supra note 7, at 100 (addressing the application of “material support” bars to 
female asylum-seekers); id. at 70–80 (analyzing the gender impacts of US anti-terrorism 
financing rules). 
95. See, e.g., Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 
53, Good Practice #21.  
96. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, ¶12 (urging Member States and requesting 
UN entities to “conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers 
of radicalization for women” and to “ensure United Nations monitoring and assessment 
mechanisms and processes mandated to prevent and respond to violent extremism, which can 
be conducive to terrorism, have the necessary gender expertise to fulfil their mandates”); Good 
Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good Practices #2, #8, 
#9; PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra note 61, 
at 231 (recommending that Member States, the United Nations, regional organizations and 
civil society should “[i]nvest in research and data collection on women’s roles in terrorism 
including identifying the drivers that lead to their radicalization and involvement with terrorist 
groups, and the impacts of counter- terrorism strategies on their lives.”).   
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within terrorist groups and from security services.97 The questions 
concerning women’s roles as agents in countering terrorism and 
violent extremism—and the more expansive question of the 
relationship between gender equality and national security—are 
particularly complex and are explored in more detail below.98  A more 
nuanced account of gender and victimhood in the post-9/11 era also 
necessarily involves preventing, identifying, and remedying a series 
of adverse gender and human rights impacts of those measures taken 
in furtherance of national security agendas; an issue to which this 
Article now turns in more detail.99  
B. Formalism and Inattentiveness to Gender-Based National Security 
Violations 
As has been observed in some feminist legal analyses, an initial 
effect of the post-9/11 “War on Terror” was to revive formalist and 
State-centric100 approaches to international law in order to underscore 
its legitimacy.101 In this immediate post-9/11 moment, international 
law’s reinvigorated formalism had a number of adverse gender 
impacts that have subsequently narrowed the capacity of international 
																																																																																																																												
97. Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good 
Practice #10; PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra 
note 61, at 231 (recommending that Member States and the United Nations should “[d]evelop 
gender-sensitive disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes that address the 
specific needs of women and girls.”); Jayne Huckerby, Gender, Violent Extremism, and 
Terrorism, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 3, 2015). 
98. See infra notes 136-96 and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra 
note 7, at 112-14 (outlining a series of tools for undertaking gender-sensitive measurement and 
monitoring of the gender and human rights dimensions and impacts of activities to counter 
terrorism and violent extremism); S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, at ¶12 (urging Member States 
and requesting United Nations entities “to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and 
data collection on the . . . impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights 
and women’s organizations”); PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING 
THE PEACE, supra note 61, at 231 (calling for “gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation of 
all counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism interventions. . .including through use 
of gender-related indicators and collection of sex-disaggregated data.”).  
100. See Heathcote, supra note 7, at 299 (“The assertion of a mainstream (or formalist) 
return to the key values of the UN Charter, or international law, leaves little space for feminist 
approaches to international law that are premised on the possibility of re-imagining 
international law’s core.”). 
101. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Remembering the Other’s Others: Theorizing the 
Approach of International Law to Muslim Fundamentalism, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
635 (2010) [hereinafter Remembering the Other’s Others]; Anne Orford, The Destiny of 
International Law, 17 LEIDEN J. of INT’L L. 441 (2004); Heathcote, supra note 7, at 300. 
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law to develop gender norms. The first of these was to emphasize 
those State-centric102 approaches to international law that traditionally 
valorized public spaces and excluded women’s experience in the 
private sphere, resulting in insufficient attention to private actors.103 
The second was to show, however, that alongside such State-centric 
approaches, international law did actually also have the capacity to 
address non-State actors—by galvanizing a serious and full-scale 
international law response to abuses by terrorists—but that it would 
also be selective as to when it chose to recalibrate the rigidity of this 
public/private divide in international law. While States were disposed 
to “far-reaching analyses of state responsibility doctrines” to hold 
States (e.g., so-called State sponsors of terrorism) responsible for the 
conduct of terrorist actors,104 the same could not be said of the 
willingness of States to enhance state responsibility doctrines when it 
concerned other forms of violence by non-State actors (e.g., domestic 
violence against women).105 This impartial convergence of feminist 
																																																																																																																												
102. See Heathcote, supra note 7, at 299 (“The assertion of a mainstream (or formalist) 
return to the key values of the UN Charter, or international law, leaves little space for feminist 
approaches to international law that are premised on the possibility of re-imagining 
international law’s core.”). A similar observation concerning the State-centric nature of 
responses to terrorism has been made in feminist engagements with critical terrorism studies 
and international security: see, e.g., Parashar & Sylvester, supra note 13; Parashar, supra note 
13.  
103. See Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 16, at 625–27 
(addressing the gendered dimensions of the public/private divide in international law); 
Feminist Methods in International Law, supra note 16, at 387–88 (arguing that the 
public/private divide of State/non-State actors in international law reinforces gender 
inequality); Johnstone, supra note 7, at 4–7 (tracing manifestations of the public/private divide 
in international law, particularly with regard to State/non-State actors and the 
international/internal dichotomy). For feminist legal critiques of the public/private distinction 
as it manifests in relation to international human rights law, see, e.g., Anne Orford, Contesting 
Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT’L. L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1712, 1715 (1998) (“[I]nternational human rights law regime that 
developed after 1945 . . . treats the state as the principal threat to the freedom of the individual, 
human dignity, and human well-being.”). See generally Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the 
Public/ Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: 
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (Dorinda Dallmeyer ed., 1993); Celina Romany, 
Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International 
Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1993).  
104. Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1099. 
105. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 1–2 (citations omitted) (comparing “the 
configuration of acts and actors of September 11, 2001” and “men’s violence against women” 
and noting that the “formal and substantive parallels between the two—prominently their 
horizontal legal architecture, large victim numbers, and masculine ideology—make both 
patterns of violence resemble dispersed armed conflict, but the world’s response to them has 
been inconsistent”); see also Johnstone, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing that states broke down 
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theory and counter-terrorism106 was an early shot across the bow to 
feminist approaches that saw opportunities for positive transformation 
in international law in the wake of 9/11. 
The third formalist effect derived from State behavior itself as 
the “War on Terror” continued beyond its initial moment. In 
particular, increased violations in the name of countering terrorism 
that targeted men and boys through actions such as torture, arbitrary 
detention, and denial of the right to life signified a return to the kinds 
of violations with which international human rights law had been 
most traditionally concerned: men as victims of the State’s civil and 
political rights violations.107 Efforts of the human rights community to 
address such violations, including, for example, detention and torture 
at Guantánamo Bay108 further entrenched this focus. A series of 
distinct and adverse gender effects flowed from this focus on State 
violations of men’s rights. For example, it has been argued—
particularly through those feminist perspectives that challenge 
“Muslim fundamentalism”—that this focus on male alleged terrorists 
as victims deprioritized women’s experience of terrorism and stymied 
the ability of international law to develop an adequate account of 
“Muslim fundamentalism” and its impact on women.109 Additionally, 
the rehashing of traditional and overly legalistic and highly technical 
arguments over whether certain activities (e.g., waterboarding) fit 
																																																																																																																												
some aspects of the public/private divide at the same time as reifying others such as “the non-
recognition of ‘enemy combatants’ as state organs or agents; privatization of military and non-
military operations during the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq; the privatization of gender 
discrimination in state (re-)building; and reinforcement of gender stereotypes and women’s 
private roles in the ‘War on Terror’”). 
106. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 7, at 3; Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1100, 1101.  
107. See Brooks, supra note 16, at 345–47; Feminist Approaches to International Law, 
supra note 16, at 627–28 (noting, for example, the use of only the masculine pronoun in the 
definition of torture, as a way to illustrate how the public/private dichotomy is pervasive in 
international law and succeeds in excluding women’s voices). 
108. See Meredith Tax, Women Have Rights Too, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2010), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/dec/13/international-criminal-court-
moreno-ocampo (“But the ‘war on terror’ has returned us, in many ways, to status quo ante: 
today, the normative human rights victim is once more a male prisoner, this time in 
Guantánamo; human rights offences by states are back at centre stage; and crimes against 
women and children are again being marginalised”). 
109. See Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 40 (2008) 
[hereinafter Terror/Torture] (“The human rights community, as a matter of basic principles of 
human rights, must hear (and respond to) the voices of victims of terrorism, their survivors, 
and all those who live in fear of such violence—just as it hears and responds to the voices of 
victims of counter-terror, their survivors and all those who live in fear of that violence. . . .”); 
Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101. 
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within international law’s definition of torture, sidelined 
developments in progressive interpretations of international law that 
sought to categorize—and elevate—private abuses of women’s rights 
(e.g., domestic violence) as State violations of torture norms.110 
Moreover, this formalism and attention to States’ male victims also 
lay the groundwork for another significant normative silence in the 
area of gender norms that has hitherto been insufficiently addressed 
by feminist approaches to international law: State violations of 
women’s rights and gender equality in counter-terrorism efforts.111 
Indeed, the focus on women’s victimhood at the hands of 
terrorists discussed above, along with a formalist impulse to address 
only men as victims of counter-terrorism, created the perfect storm 
for silence on State violations of women’s rights and gender equality 
in counter-terrorism efforts. Remarkably, it was not until 2009—eight 
years removed from the events of 9/11—that the adverse gender 
impacts of counter-terrorism were first catalogued at the international 
level through a report to the UN General Assembly by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.112 The report 
																																																																																																																												
110. See Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101, at 659–60, 698; see also 
Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 
25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 337 (1993-1994) (arguing that in certain circumstances 
domestic violence should be recognized as torture); Heathcote, supra note 7, at 297 
(“[S]ubversive feminist accounts in response to the global war against terrorism, alongside 
other critical and/or subversive approaches, became difficult to articulate when the dominant 
Western narrative appeared to function to reject international legal norms.”); id. at 300 (noting 
the subsequent exclusion of “feminists, women, critical theorists, writers from the global 
south, postcolonial theorists and third world approaches”). 
111. See A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra 
note 7, at 9 (“Over the last decade of the United States’ ‘War on Terror,’ the oft-unspoken 
assumption that men suffer the most—both numerically and in terms of the nature of rights 
violations endured—has obscured the way women and sexual minorities experience counter-
terrorism, rendering their rights violations invisible to policymakers and the human rights 
community alike.”); Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1121 (reflecting on the need to “pay[] close 
attention to the experiences of women as the subjects of counterterrorism norms underscores 
the unique vulnerabilities that women face when their lives intersect with powerful patriarchal 
institutions and interests”). 
112. See generally U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93. The author was involved in the 
research and writing of this report. For earlier consideration by the UN Special Rapporteur of 
the gender dimensions and impacts of counter-terrorism, see Promotion and Protection of All 
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development, ¶¶ 21, 38, 62–63, 73(c), Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17 
(discussing the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism); UN Secretary-General, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/62/263 (Aug. 15, 2007); Special 
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builds upon earlier work of the UN Special Rapporteur to provide a 
“comprehensive overview of the frequency and nature of gender-
based human rights abuses in counter-terrorism measures and to 
explore the complex relationship between gender equality and 
countering terrorism.”113 Significantly, the report, following on the 
mandate’s instruction to “integrate a gender perspective,” reflects a 
social definition of gender as distinguished from the biological 
definition of sex and therefore discusses, besides the human rights of 
women, the gendered impact of counter-terrorism measures on men 
and persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, and 
addresses how gender intersects with other prohibited grounds of 
discrimination, such as race and religion.114 The use of this gender 
lens means that the report, while predominantly focused on women’s 
experiences, highlights the gender performativity at stake in 
additional areas, including the use of interrogation techniques against 
male terrorist suspects in detention facilities,115 as well as ways in 
which governments use the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, and intersex individuals as bartering tools to appease 
terrorist groups.116 The reaction to the report amongst a number of 
States and some conservative non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), however, teetered on vitriolic and hyperbolic, with many 
																																																																																																																												
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 
2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”, ¶¶ 72, 92, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/26. For subsequent documentation of the gender and human rights impacts of 
counter-terrorism, including those particularly focusing on the post-9/11 era, see Phumzile 
Mlambo-Ngcuka & Radhika Coomaraswamy, Women are the Best Weapon in the War Against 
Terrorism, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 10, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/10/women-are-
the-best-weapon-in-the-war-against-terrorism/ (“Militarized counterterrorism operations 
disrupt economic and social activity, and destroy civilian infrastructure—the schools, markets, 
and medical facilities relied on by women in traditional caring roles.”). See generally GENDER, 
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 4; A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7; 
Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8; Ní Aoláin, supra note 4.  
113. U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 19. 
114. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20 (quoting another source); see also Dianne Otto, Transnational Homo-
Assemblages: Reading ‘Gender’ in Counter-terrorism Discourses, 4 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 
79, 82 (2013) (analyzing the use of a gender lens in the report). 
115. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 44; see also Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, 
Gender Trouble at Abu Ghraib?, 1 POLS. & GENDER 597 (2005); (EN)GENDERING THE WAR 
ON TERROR: WAR STORIES AND CAMOUFLAGED POLITICS (Krista Hunt & Kim Rygiel eds., 
2007); ONE OF THE GUYS: WOMEN AS AGGRESSORS AND TORTURERS (Tara McKelvey ed., 
2007). 
116. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 36. 
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challenging the use of a social (versus a biological) definition of 
gender and the report’s consideration of sexual orientation and gender 
identity.117 In an unusual step demonstrative of the extent of this 
negative reaction, the UN General Assembly deleted references to the 
report from its annual resolution on human rights and counter-
terrorism.118 
The report was significant, not only as the first global—albeit 
belated—account of gender-based violations in the name of national 
security, but also because its reaction is a litmus test of the capacity of 
international law to advance gender norms in an overarching national 
security environment in five key ways. The first is that it evinces a 
new testing of the public/private divide in international law, on the 
one hand reflecting the reticence of governments to acknowledge that 
State counter-terrorism measures—inadvertently or otherwise—could 
adversely impact women, but on the other, showing its willingness to 
invest in addressing violence against women by terrorist actors. This 
constitutes a reversal of the usual complaint of feminist approaches to 
international law, i.e., that States focus disproportionately on public 
violence at the expense of that in the private spheres. In large part, 
this reversal can be attributed to the ongoing influence of national 
security discourses that, in the immediate to mid-range aftermath of 
9/11, still utilized or relied upon a model of the State as the savior of 
women who are victims of terrorist savages.119 Under this binary 
model, it was simply not possible for many international stakeholders 
to contemplate the State as a violator of women’s rights; 
demonstrating that “beyond the language of victimhood and defense 
																																																																																																																												
117. See, e.g., Political Affairs Head Says UN Efforts to Assist Election in ‘High 
Demand’ as Third Committee’s Debate on Promotion of Human Rights Continue, U.N. Doc. 
GA/SHC/3959 (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gashc3959.doc.htm; 
see also Transnational Homo-Assemblages: Reading ‘Gender’ in Counter-terrorism 
Discourses, supra note 114, at 85 (“Endorsement of the report came from states in the Western 
European and Other Group (WEOG) and the Latin American Group, many of whom 
performed their gay-friendliness by making a point of showing their familiarity and ease with 
using the identity categories of sexual and gender minorities.”). 
118. See G.A. Res. 64/168 (Dec. 18, 2009). For the votes, see Overview of the 64th 
Session of the General Assembly, INT’L SERV. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 4 n.13 (2010), http://
www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/hrm_2009_general_assembly_forweb_0.pdf. 
119. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See generally Makua Mutua, Savages, 
Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 201 (2001). 
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of the female, there is little political room for a full engagement with 
sex, sexism, and gender intricacies in the counterterrorism terrain.”120 
Secondly, to some extent, the reaction to the report also provides 
insights into the ongoing challenges in the gender/sex debate under 
international law. Feminist approaches to international law have 
largely preferred the use of the social category of gender to fully 
extrapolate an understanding of international rules and their effects.121 
The use of a gender lens has been similarly critical in feminist 
critiques of the fields of international relations and security studies 
that have challenged the often-interchangeable use of “gender” and 
“sex” and applied the social definition of gender.122 However, the 
categories of gender and sex have been contested ones in international 
law’s discourse and practice, with some States continuing to prefer 
the use of a narrower, biological category of sex centered on the 
traditional male/female binary, rather than a broader definition of 
gender as a social construct that includes, for example, engagement in 
a discussion of masculinities, femininities, and gender identity and 
sexual orientation.123 At the same time, however, “more recent 
international law efforts have shifted toward a focus on gender and 
sexuality,”124 such that many of the core concepts in the report—the 
use of a social definition of gender that also addresses sexual 
																																																																																																																												
120. Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1116–17 (citations omitted) (noting that “[t]he limits of 
progressive equality briefing in the context of counterterrorism policy are poignantly proven 
by the Special Rapporteur’s decision in 2009 to go beyond reporting on harms to women. . . . 
The Report garnered tremendously negative political responses by a variety of states. . . . The 
conclusion one can draw is awkward. A gendered account of counterterrorism strategies that 
concentrates on female harm can carve out acceptable political space. But beyond the language 
of victimhood and defense of the female, there is little political room for a full engagement 
with sex, sexism, and gender intricacies in the counterterrorism terrain.”). 
121.  Feminist Methods in International Law, supra note 16, at 379 (“Feminist methods 
. . . insist on the importance of gender relations as a category of analysis. The term ‘gender’ 
here refers to the social construction of differences between women and men and ideas of 
‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’—the excess cultural baggage associated with biological sex.”). 
122.  See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 13, at 158 (“including women as a category of 
identity within security discourse without also integrating gender as unit of analysis creates 
silences”); Tickner, supra note 13, at 336 (defining gender as “a set of variable, but socially 
and culturally constructed relational characteristics” and analyzing the post-9/11 moment 
through a gender lens). 
123. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender 
Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 14–18 
(2005) (outlining the sex/gender distinction in international law and arguing that it is elided in 
the context of gender mainstreaming where gender is synonymous with women). 
124. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong With Women’s Rights, 20 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98, 101 (2011). 
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orientation and gender identity, as well as the need to address women 
in various capacities (e.g., as victims, perpetrators, and agents of 
change)—have strong and long antecedents in other areas of 
international human rights law and practice.125 Against this normative 
backdrop, the furor over the report’s use of a social definition of 
gender then looks more like a smokescreen than substantive concern, 
requiring that other explanations for the nature of the reaction be 
explored. The third insight provided by the report’s reaction 
therefore—particularly given the perspective of those States and some 
NGOs who objected to the report interpreting “gender perspective” to 
incorporate sexual orientation and gender identity—regards the 
ongoing, significant challenges in the “project of queering 
international law.”126 As such, it also highlights some of the 
inclusivity challenges in feminist approaches to international law, 
whereby some feminist advocates are reticent to advance the rights of 
those of diverse sexual orientation and gender identities on the basis 
that it could undermine women’s rights claims.127 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the reaction to the report 
is instructive on the project of gender mainstreaming and, in 
particular, the very limited ability of international norms on gender to 
traverse different areas of international rule-making and 
implementation. The report’s use of a social definition of gender is 
one that has been adopted elsewhere in international human rights 
law, including by other UN Special Rapporteurs and women-specific 
institutions without fanfare.128 As such it is very difficult to escape the 
conclusion that a core cause of consternation was that the concepts 
were being applied by a non-gender-specific part of the United 
																																																																																																																												
125.  A Sign of “Weakness”?, supra note 34, at 120–21 (citations omitted) (identifying 
the different usages of “gender,” and noting that “[b]y the mid-1990s, the official definition of 
‘gender’ in the U.N. system had become a version of gender as a social category, although the 
biological version was retained in the term ‘sex’”). 
126. Transnational Homo-Assemblages: Reading ‘Gender’ in Counter-terrorism 
Discourses, supra note 114, at 85–86. 
127. See id. at 91–94. 
128. See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
General Recommendation No. 25, on Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, on Temporary Special Measures, 
n.2 reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004) (quoting 1999 World 
Survey on the Role of Women in Development, United Nations, New York, 1999, ix) 
(“Gender is defined as the social meanings given to biological sex differences . . . Thus, gender 
is a social stratifier. . . It helps us understand the social construction of gender identities and 
the unequal structure of power that underlies the relationship between the sexes.”). 
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Nation’s institutional machinery (the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism) in a report to a non-human rights body 
(the UN General Assembly). It, therefore, serves as an indictment of 
the ability of the category of “gender” to travel beyond women-
specific institutions (e.g., the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination of Women) or issues traditionally associated with 
women (e.g., gender-based violence) to have transformative effects in 
core areas of governance, such as national security policy-making and 
implementation. Relatedly, subsequent revelations about the intent of 
the Egyptian government to dispute the report to discredit the UN 
Special Rapporteur in advance of an upcoming country visit to Egypt, 
further highlight the fragility of norms on gender equality in the face 
of broader political agendas, as well as these norms’ permeability in a 
post-9/11 era, where governments regularly prioritize resisting 
scrutiny of their human rights record in countering terrorism above 
other issues of human rights concern.129 
Instead of a feminist approach that ignores or downplays gender-
based violations in counter-terrorism and countering violent 
extremism, however, there is a tripartite typology that can—and 
should—be developed to address State-based harms toward women 
and girls in the name of national security. Such a typology would 
necessarily reflect an intersectional approach, recognizing how these 
gendered experiences are often shaped by a number of other factors, 
including, in many contexts, the disproportionate impacts on Muslim 
communities of national security policies in the post-9/11 era. The 
first aspect of this typology is to appreciate how such policies have 
undermined the rights of women and girls through their focus on men 
and boys as the subject of counter-terrorism interventions. For 
example, the development-security nexus under wider, holistic 
approaches to countering violent extremism that focuses on providing 
development assistance (e.g., livelihood opportunities) to those most 
at risk of “radicalization” in a particular community—primarily men 
and young boys—reallocates resources in ways that risk further 
marginalization of women and girls who often face more acute 
																																																																																																																												
129. See Martin Scheinin, Foreword, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at xi, xiv. 
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development needs in their community.130 Another example of this 
category of violations is when female family members of those 
directly impacted by national security measures—such as torture, 
disappearance, illegal detention, and killings in the context of 
countering terrorism—experience adverse primary and collateral 
consequences (e.g., economic rights deprivations).131 Secondly, 
governments’ national security policies and practices have also, in 
many cases, directly discriminated against women and women’s 
rights organizations. For example, some governments have penalized 
freedom of expression and association through the use of counter-
terrorism measures to improperly surveil and suppress activities of 
women’s human rights defenders.132 In other cases, governments have 
detained or interrogated female relatives of terrorists or violent 
extremists who themselves have no purported connection to terrorism 
or violent extremism as a form of leverage over their male 
relatives.133 Finally, national security policy and practice can result in 
discriminatory treatment because of a failure to consider the 
underlying gender dynamics in the operating environments in which 
measures are being implemented. For example, while anti-terrorism 
financing and material support rules and policies are ostensibly 
gender-neutral, in practice they can often be gender discriminatory.134 
Such counter-terrorism financing rules by their nature favor large, 
well-known organizations and require strict reporting and auditing 
requirements, whereas, in practice, women’s organizations are small, 
																																																																																																																												
130. See, e.g., A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, 
supra note 7, at 30–53 (addressing the gender impacts of development activities to counter 
terrorism and violent extremism). 
131. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 30 (citations omitted) (detailing gender 
impacts of enforced disappearances of male detainees); A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER 
IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7, at 54–69 (addressing gender impacts of 
militarized counter-terrorism, including on female family members); id. at 81–96 (addressing 
gender impacts of intelligence and law enforcement measures, including on female family 
members); Ramzi Kassem, Gendered Erasure in the Global “War on Terror”: An Unmasked 
Interrogation, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN 
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 15, 17 (“Although it has been largely invisible, ‘War 
on Terror’ rendition, interrogation, and detention practices that ensnare men have a concrete 
and indisputable impact on women, especially spouses.”). 
132. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 27. 
133. See id. ¶ 31. 
134. See, e.g., id. ¶ 42; A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-
TERRORISM, supra note 7, at 70–80; Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects on the 
Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, WOMEN PEACEMAKERS 
PROGRAM (2015), https://www.womenpeacemakersprogram.org/assets/CMS/Resources/Repor
ts/Policy-brief-CTM.pdf. 
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informal, may need to operate below the radar due to local safety 
concerns, and often do not have the administrative infrastructure 
necessary to comply with these reporting and auditing 
requirements.135 
C. Which Women’s Rights Count and How: The Conjoining of 
Feminism and National Security 
Another key normative consequence of the post-9/11 context is 
that it is women’s rights with a national security nexus that have 
gained the most traction in international law and the attention of its 
institutions. This conjoining of women’s rights and national security 
agendas was an immediate feature of the 9/11 response,136 but its 
presence and role in countering terrorism and violent extremism has 
subsequently evolved and requires separate and more detailed 
attention in feminist approaches to international law. This evolution 
can be observed in at least four distinct, but related steps in unfolding 
national security practice, which I detail in roughly sequential order, 
before reflecting on the implications of these developments for 
determining not only which rights count, but also how they are 
normatively defined. In this account, I also seek to be explicit about 
whose rights are being elevated and which feminist interpretations of 
international law feature at each stage of the conjoining.  
The first stage in the conjoining, as referenced above, was in the 
initial call in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to rescue Afghan 
women as part of the public push to justify the launch of Operation 
Enduring Freedom against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.137 
Feminist critiques of the consequences of this invocation of women’s 
rights have aptly identified the moral and strategic cover it sought to 
provide for military action in response to the events of 9/11, as well as 
its adverse gender impacts (such as the silencing of voices of Afghan 
women).138 
The next stage in the evolution of national security practice is 
that specific instances of women’s rights violations also became 
defined as national security threats. Perhaps the earliest and most 
																																																																																																																												
135. See, e.g., A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, 
supra note 7, at 70–80; Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects on the Implementation of 
the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, supra note 134. 
136. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
138. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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prominent example of this concerns trafficking in persons, where in 
the post-9/11 environment, the United States and other governments 
began to identify linkages between terrorism and trafficking, 
focusing, for example, on trafficking and terrorism’s shared character 
as transborder threats, the contribution of trafficking to terrorist 
mobility, and the role of trafficking in creating unstable nations.139 As 
a consequence of these purported linkages, governments also began to 
identify how counter-terrorism strategies should encompass efforts 
aimed at the eradication of trafficking in persons, calling, for 
example, for securitized borders as a policy response to both 
phenomena.140 Significantly for feminist analyses of international law, 
this post-9/11 merging of the anti-trafficking and anti-terrorism 
agendas was not ideology-free. Instead, it centered a certain Western 
feminist and abolitionist perspective that favored criminalized and 
securitized responses to saving vulnerable Global South women from 
the scourge of sex trafficking, rather than addressing, for example, 
labor trafficking or domestic trafficking or utilizing labor, human 
rights, or migration frameworks.141 
The next—and most marked—opportunity for the uptake of 
some women’s rights concerns in national security came with the 
expansion of national security policy and practice toward a whole-of- 
government approach that mobilized areas such as development, 
human rights, and rule of law, particularly from 2006 onward when 
the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted.142 The 
adoption of the Strategy was itself in part an attempt to correct the 
UN response to terrorism up until that point, which had been very 
much driven by the UN Security Council and predominantly limited 
																																																																																																																												
139. See Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, supra note 40. 
140. See id.; see also U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 51. 
141. See generally Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, supra note 40. The 
influence of this perspective can be most starkly observed, for example, in December 2002, 
when President George W. Bush signed his first National Security Presidential Directive 22 
(NSPD-22) entitled “Combatting Trafficking in Persons.” Emphasizing the “transnational 
threat” posed by trafficking, NSPD-22 specifically states that US anti-trafficking policy is 
“based on an abolitionist approach to trafficking in persons. . . . In this regard, the United 
States Government opposes prostitution and any related activities . . . . These activities are 
inherently harmful and dehumanizing. The United States Government’s position is that these 
activities should not be regulated as a legitimate form of work for any human being.” See Nat’l 
Sec. Presidential Directive, Combating Trafficking in Persons, NSPD 22, 64–65 (Dec. 16, 
2002). 
142.  G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4. 
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to traditional security measures.143 Accordingly, it contains four 
pillars that represent a mixture of “hard” and “soft” approaches: 
tackling the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; 
preventing and combating terrorism; building States’ capacity to 
prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN 
system in that respect; and ensuring respect for human rights for all 
and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against 
terrorism.144 Subsequent domestic practice emulates and builds upon 
this more holistic approach to countering terrorism and violent 
extremism, which is also referred to as “preventing violent 
extremism” (“PVE”) in some specific domestic contexts.145 
																																																																																																																												
143. See UN Counterterrorism Framework: Key Programs and Tools, CHARITY & SEC. 
NETWORK (May 1, 2013), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/analysis/UN_Counterterrorism_
Framework_Key_Programs_and_Tools (“After 9/11, many UN members expressed concern 
that the Security Council led counterterrorism framework was usurping the authority of the 
General Assembly and largely limiting its focus to security measures. In response, the General 
Assembly voted unanimously in September 2006 to adopt the UN Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy (Strategy), which advances a more holistic approach than the Security Council 
regime.”). In April 2005, in another nod to the importance of human rights, the then-United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 2005/80 decided to appoint, for a 
period of three years, a UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. See Off. of the Comm’r on 
Human Rights, ¶ 14, Human Rights Res. 2005/80, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2005/80 (Apr. 21, 
2005). This mandate was subsequently assumed by the UN Human Rights Council in Apr. 3, 
2006, and extended for one year, subject to the review to be undertaken by the Council in 
Human Rights Council decision 2006/102 (June 30, 2006). The UN Human Rights Council 
extended the mandate for a period of three years by Human Rights Council Res. 15/15, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/Res15/15 (Sept. 30, 2010), and further extended for another period of three years 
by Human Rights Council Res. 22/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/22/8 (Mar. 21, 2013). To some 
extent this move toward more holistic approaches also derived from advocacy efforts with the 
human rights community itself: in the face of increasing violations of human rights in 
individual practices, as well as an overarching marginalization of human rights law and 
discourse, many in the human rights community directed efforts in the aftermath of 9/11 
toward trying to have human rights respected and ensured in the fight against terrorism. 
144.  G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4. 
145. In the US government, CVE has both a domestic and international component. See 
Fact Sheet, supra note 73; THE WHITE HOUSE, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) (detailing the first US plan to counter 
violent extremism domestically); Programs and Initiatives, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#CVE (last visited Jan. 17, 2016) (“CVE is a pillar of the 
Administration’s strategic approach to counterterrorism.”). In the United Kingdom, in July 
2011, the government published the third version of its counter-terrorism strategy 
(CONTEST), which consists of four strands: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. See 
generally SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, PREVENT STRATEGY, 2011, 
Cm. 8092, (U.K.). According to the four-year Prevent strategy also released in 2011, Prevent 
seeks “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” and has three objectives: 
“respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who 
promote it; prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given 
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In particular, the new field of countering violent extremism 
means that national security practice began to “mov[e] further 
upstream to address root causes of extremist violence,”146 increasingly 
touching and seeking to subsume traditionally feminized areas of 
practice or sectors where women have had critical roles, such as in 
highly localized and informal efforts to ensure peace or to build 
community resilience or in the development of cooperative and trust-
based relationships between security institutions and civil society.147 
The field of countering violent extremism is also often styled as a 
long-term effort to address terrorism and violent extremism in 
contrast to States’ initial focus in the aftermath of 9/11 on the 
immediate tasks of enhancing capacity and undertaking measures in 
the areas of law enforcement, investigation, and prosecution.148 This 
widening of the understanding of what constitutes national security 
policy and practice, as well as the emphasis on developing preventive, 
long-term, local, and context-specific strategic approaches,149 
notionally created greater space for the incorporation of women’s 
rights issues, as well as greater attention to promoting women’s 
participation, including in their families, communities, educational 
institutions, and public sector. Additionally, as discussed above, under 
these more holistic approaches, contemporary national security 
practices have also increasingly stressed the need to counteract the 
dehumanization of victims of terrorism.150 This focus on victims has 
provided an additional key opportunity for incorporation of those 
																																																																																																																												
appropriate advice and support; and work with a wide range of sectors and institutions . . . 
where there are risks of radicalisation. . . .” See id. at 6, 40.  
146. Holmer, supra note 12, at 2.  
147. See id. and supra notes 72, 82, and 162 and accompanying text; see also Good 
Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter 
Violent Extremism, supra note 12, at 4 (Good Practice 5). The OSCE has similarly produced 
detailed guidance on this mainstreaming of gender and the inclusion of women in community 
policing as a CVE tool. See PREVENTING TERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION THAT LEAD TO TERRORISM: A COMMUNITY-POLICING 
APPROACH, supra note 72, at 142–45.  
148. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/68/841, supra note 6, ¶ 20. 
149. See, e.g., Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented 
Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism, supra note 12, at 1 (“[L]ocally-relevant CVE 
initiatives are central to the success of any strategy.”); Fact Sheet, supra note 73 (“The 
underlying premise of the approach to countering violent extremism in the United States is that 
(1) communities provide the solution to violent extremism; and (2) CVE efforts are best 
pursued at the local level, tailored to local dynamics, where local officials continue to build 
relationships within their communities through established community policing and 
community outreach mechanisms.”). 
150. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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feminist perspectives—particularly of those feminists opposing 
“Muslim fundamentalism”151—that stress the pervasiveness of 
terrorist violence against women and define addressing such violence 
as a core component of counter-terrorism, and indeed international 
law more broadly. 
In particular, women, peace, and security issues, and the 
participation of women peace-builders have been given heightened 
attention within this broader and more localized approach to 
countering terrorism and violent extremism.152 This conjoining 
derives in large part from the understanding of the close nexus 
between conflict and terrorism in contemporary national security 
discourse and practice. As reflected in early feminist accounts, initial 
State responses in the immediate aftermath of the events of 9/11 
unequivocally placed both terrorism and counter-terrorism within a 
conflict paradigm, leading to the preference for a militarized 
responses to terrorism, rather than alternate approaches that 
emphasized law enforcement and/or human rights. While thinking 
and practice on the conflict-terrorism nexus has evolved and become 
somewhat more nuanced in the intervening years,153 there is still a 
strong commitment to addressing the “peace and security dimensions 
of counter-terrorism,”154 particularly through activities addressed at 
conflict resolution and prevention under Pillar I of the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy,155 as well as through the promotion of 
																																																																																																																												
151. See, e.g., Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101; Terror/Torture, supra 
note 109. 
152. See generally Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4 (identifying a series of 
convergences between “international conflict feminism” and counter-terrorism discourse and 
practice). 
153. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2195, preambular ¶ 16 (Dec. 19, 2014) (“Emphasizing that the 
combined presence of terrorism, violent extremism, and transnational organized crime may 
exacerbate conflicts in affected regions . . . and noting that terrorist groups benefiting from 
transnational organized crime can, in some cases and in some regions, complicate conflict 
prevention and resolution efforts.”); U.N. Doc. A/68/841, supra note 6, ¶ 21 (“Terrorism is 
increasingly a factor in areas of conflict, and awareness of the Strategy and an understanding 
of terrorism are especially important for peacekeeping, special political and other United 
Nations support missions in conflict and post-conflict environments where terrorism and 
terrorist tactics remain evident.”). 
154. U.N. Doc. A/68/841, supra note 6, ¶ 22. 
155. Id. ¶¶ 22, 27, 34, 36-37, 47 (noting that under Pillar I’s focus on “[p]reventing and 
resolving conflicts” there are a number of activities that seek to address the intersections of 
peace and security with counter-terrorism and CVE, including “strengthening fragile 
democratic transitions and transforming confrontation into dialogue”; enhancing “national 
capacities for conflict prevention to strengthen the resilience of societies”; utilizing 
“systematic conflict analysis” to “inform the design and execution of preventive measures to 
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human rights under its Pillar IV.156 In addition to the opportunities for 
overlap deriving from States’ ongoing attachment to the conflict-
terrorism nexus, such a conjoining was facilitated by the parallel 
ascendancy of the women, peace, and security agenda at the UN 
Security Council from 2000 onward.157 The fact that “international 
conflict feminism” and counter-terrorism share both a “security 
paradigm” and “rule of law framework,” has meant that such an 
ascendancy of “international conflict feminism” was readily “allied 
not only with intervention, but also the post-intervention push for 
nation-building institutional arrangements that pay homage to the 
intervening powers and/or serve their interests.”158 Additionally, as 
has been noted in some feminist engagement with security studies and 
particularly the concept of “human security,” the traction gained by 
the women, peace, and security agenda owes much to the salience of 
the human security framework which informed and then subsequently 
securitized the agenda, as well as women and women’s issues more 
broadly.159 Accordingly, in the immediate post-9/11 environment, it 
was those women’s organizations that were “already oriented toward 
security”—including because of their work on the women, peace, and 
security agenda—that had the opportunity to become more prominent 
than other women’s groups.160 This trend toward overlapping of 
																																																																																																																												
counter the emergence of radicalization and violent extremism”; and giving peace operations 
“disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation mandates where the armed groups to enter the 
programmes sometimes have terrorist links”). 
156. Id. ¶ 22. 
157. Additionally this conjoining is facilitated by the prevention pillar of UNSCR 1325, 
pursuant to which one of the four goals or outcomes is that “[i]nternational, national and non-
State security actors are responsive to and held to account for any violations of the rights of 
women and girls, in line with international standards.” See UN Secretary-General, Women and 
Peace and Security, at annex 35, U.N. Doc. S/2010/498 (Sept. 28, 2010). There are three 
indicators for voluntary reporting by Member States to meet this goal. See id. (“Percentage of 
reported cases of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by uniformed, civilian 
peacekeepers and/or humanitarian workers that are acted upon out of the total number of 
referred cases.”); id. at 36 (“Extent to which measures to protect women’s and girls’ human 
rights are included in directives issued by heads of military components and heads of police 
components of peacekeeping missions.”). Indicator 5(b) specifically refers to national security. 
See id. (“Extent to which measures to protect women’s and girls’ human rights are included in 
national security policy frameworks).  
158.  Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4, at 133. 
159. See generally NATALIE FLOREA HUDSON, GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE 
UNITED NATIONS: SECURITY LANGUAGE AS A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR WOMEN (2010) 
[hereinafter GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS]. 
160.  See Julie Mertus, Road Blocks, Blind Spots, Speed Bumps: A Feminist Look at the 
Post-9/11 Landscape for NGOs, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 7, at 98, 103.  
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women, peace, and security and counter-terrorism was formally 
addressed by the UN Security Council in October 2013 when it 
explicitly conjoined actions pursuant to UNSCR 1325 with counter-
terrorism efforts in its UNSCR 2122, which expressed its intention to 
incorporate women, peace, and security issues in all relevant thematic 
areas of work on its agenda, including in threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts.161 This conjoining then spurred a 
series of institutional acknowledgements of the overlap within the UN 
Security Council,162 UN General Assembly,163 and UN Human Rights 
Council,164 which have also stressed the need for women’s 
participation as a core component of efforts to counter terrorism and 
violent extremism. Very occasionally, women, peace, and security 
issues—particularly those concerning violations of women’s rights 
and sexual violence—have also been integrated into counter-terrorism 
sanctions regimes.165 
Finally, it has been increasingly and more recently argued that 
gender inequality and/or women’s insecurity writ large—as opposed 
to specific violations of rights as in the case of trafficking in persons 
or of women’s rights under the Taliban in Afghanistan—is a threat to 
national security, such that the promotion of gender equality should 
itself be considered a counter-terrorism measure.166 This approach 
recasts “feminism” as a counter-terrorism strategy.167 It is most 
readily encapsulated in the emphasis on women’s rights promotion as 
not just being the “right” thing to do, but also the “smart” thing from 
																																																																																																																												
161. S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 33, ¶ 3.  
162. S.C. Res. 2178 supra note 12, ¶ 16; S.C. Res. 2195, supra note 153, preambular ¶ 
14; S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, ¶ 11; S.C. Res. 2250 ¶ 16 (Dec. 9, 2015). In particular, of 
these UN Security Council Resolutions, UNSCR 2242 pays the most detailed attention to the 
roles of women in violent extremism and its response, see S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, ¶¶ 
11-13, and calls for “greater integration” of the women, peace, and security, and counter-
terrorism and countering violent extremism agendas, see S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, ¶ 11. 
See also Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/21 ¶ 11 
(Oct. 28, 2014). 
163.  G.A. Res. 68/276, supra note 4, preambular ¶ 20.  
164.  U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/L.25/Rev.1 ¶ 4 (Oct. 1, 2015). 
165. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/2014/693, supra note 53, ¶ 9. 
166. See generally Barbara Ehrenreich, A New Counterterrorism Strategy: Feminism, in 
STOP THE NEXT WAR NOW: EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 78 
(Medea Benjamin and Jodie Evans, eds., 2005) (advocating for supporting human rights for 
women and girls in order to combat terrorism in areas where “extremist Islamic insurgency” is 
prevalent); Terror/Torture, supra note 109, at 49. 
167. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 166, at 78 (“So here in one word is my new 
counterterrorism strategy: feminism.”). 
576 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:533 
a security perspective, reflecting an instrumentalist approach to 
women’s rights advocacy that can be traced to early feminist concerns 
about gain reversal in the aftermath of 9/11 and the need to keep 
women’s rights, and women, on and at the table.168 This approach is 
one particularly championed by Western governments, most ardently 
by the United States, and it often draws its support from explicit 
reference to the women, peace, and security agenda rather than, for 
example, references to human rights obligations concerning women’s 
non-discriminatory participation in all forms of public life.169 Indeed, 
this particular framing extrapolates from one of the core rationales for 
promoting women’s inclusion and gender mainstreaming in peace, 
and security more broadly: the idea that “peace is inextricably linked 
with equality between men and women.”170 As such, efforts to link 
gender equality and countering violent extremism also tend to stress 
																																																																																																																												
168. See, e.g., GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 159, 
at 31 (noting that securitization of an issue enables greater allocation of resources). 
169. See, e.g., Hearing on Nominations: Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Melanne Verveer, Ambassador-at-Large-Designate for 
Global Women’s Issues), http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/VerveerTestimony090324p
.pdf; International Violence Against Women: Stories and Solutions: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Melanne Verveer, Ambassador-at-Large, Office of Global 
Women’s Issues); Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the 10th Anniversary of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Oct. 26, 2010), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150010.htm; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, 
Remarks at the Women in the World Stories and Solutions Summit (Mar. 11, 2011), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/158220.htm; Dep’t of State, Fact Sheet: The United 
States and UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Promoting the Political Participation of 
Women in All Aspects of Peace and Security (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2010/10/150006.htm; Rahim Kanani, An In-depth Interview with Melanne Verveer, U.S. 
Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2011), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/rahim-kanani/melanee-verveer-us-ambassador-at-large_b_833073.ht
ml; Mark Landler, A New Gender Agenda: Interview with Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Aug. 21, 2009, at MM 41; Juan Lozano, Clinton Champions Women’s Rights Worldwide, 
HOUSTON CHRON. (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ metropolitan/634
7110.html; Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent 
Extremism (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/19/remarks-
president-summit-countering-violent-extremism-february-19-2015 (“And as we go forward, 
let’s commit to expanding education, including for girls. Expanding opportunity, including for 
women. Nations will not truly succeed without the contributions of their women.”); Press 
Release, White House, Fact Sheet: “A Moment of Opportunity” in the Middle East and North 
Africa (May 19, 2011), http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/fact-sheet-
moment-opportunity-middle-east-and-north-africa; Melanne Verveer, Ambassador-at-Large 
for Global Women’s Issues, Women, Peace and Security (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.state.gov/
s/gwi/rls/rem/2011/161196.htm; WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
170. Mlambo-Ngcuka & Coomaraswamy, supra note 112. 
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that gender inequality is a sign of at-risk communities, such that it “is 
no coincidence that in societies and communities where gender 
equality indicators are higher, women are less vulnerable to the 
impacts of violent extremism,”171 and to call for women’s 
engagement on the basis that “an increase in women empowerment 
and gender equality has a positive effect on countering extremism, as 
it does similarly in peace building.”172 Feminists opposing “Muslim 
fundamentalism” have also again been particularly key allied voices 
in this form of conjoining by emphasizing the impact of some terrorist 
violence against women, but also the broader need for international 
law and lawyers to mobilize a response that fully addresses these 
impacts and discontinues its deference to purportedly competing 
human rights norms (e.g., the rights of male victims of counter-
terrorism or of freedom of religion).173 
These efforts to converge women’s rights and national security 
have had a series of consequences for the international landscape on 
gender norms. An account of these impacts necessarily draws on 
those rich feminist legal analyses that have queried the normative 
damage that is done to women’s rights as it has moved from 
international law’s margins to its mainstream, particularly through the 
ascendance of women, peace, and security agenda in the UN Security 
Council;174 but also in other areas where “governance feminism” has 
																																																																																																																												
171. Id. (“Overwhelming evidence from around the world shows that women’s 
empowerment is a powerful force for economic growth, social and political stability, and 
sustainable peace.”). 
172. See Krista London Couture, A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent 
Extremism: Lessons Learned from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Applied 
Successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco, FOREIGN POL’Y: BROOKINGS viii (2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30-gender-conflict-preventio
n-countering-violent-extremism-couture/women-cve-formatted-72914-couture-final2.pdf. See 
further PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra note 
61, at 227 (recognizing the link but concluding that “[i]ncreasing recognition of women’s 
participation and empowerment should not be part of counter-terrorism strategies but a part of 
the civilian peace agenda.”).   
173. See, e.g., Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101, at 636; Terror/Torture, 
supra note 109; supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
174. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 34; A Sign of “Weakness”?, supra note 34, at 162 
(“If the transformative goals of international women’s peace movements are not being 
furthered by the increased participation of women in conflict-related decision-making, then 
whose project is being advanced?”); Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on 
Gender Issues in International Law over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2009) 
[hereinafter The Exile of Inclusion] (analyzing the consequences of the UN Security Council’s 
adoption of the women, peace, and security agenda for “the long feminist struggle to utilise 
international law to promote and protect women’s rights and gender equality, and to secure 
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had traction, such as in the area of international criminal law and sex 
trafficking.175 Other areas of feminist inquiry that emphasize the role 
of women’s rights in servicing repressive international policy 
responses in counter-terrorism and practice176 are also particularly 
salient here. Applying these insights illuminates some outcomes for 
gender norms and international law in the post-9/11 era as follows. 
The first such outcome, as mentioned above, is that the 
conjoining has given traction to some areas of protection for women’s 
rights and not others. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that two of 
the women’s rights issues that have arguably gained most prominence 
in the post-9/11 era—the women, peace, and security agenda, and 
anti-trafficking efforts—are ones that governments perceived to have 
had a national security nexus or at least a very ready overlay with 
national security objectives and practices. Significantly, both of these 
areas were in nascent stages at the time of the events of 9/11—
UNSCR 1325 had been adopted on October 31, 2000 and the first 
comprehensive international anti-trafficking instrument (the UN 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the ‟UN 
Trafficking Protocol”)) on November 15, 2000.177 The evolving and 
more omnipotent national security environment fundamentally shaped 
the norms underpinning these frameworks; for example, I have 
detailed elsewhere the impact of this timing and the perceived 
trafficking-terror nexus on favoring a securitized rather than human 
rights-based approach to trafficking in persons that focused on 
enhancing border controls and criminal responses to the phenomenon 
of transnational sex trafficking of foreign women.178 
																																																																																																																												
peace.”); Power and Danger, supra note 1 (assessing whether the UN Security Council’s 
adoption of a series of thematic resolutions on women, peace, and security confirms the 
account of “governance feminism”). 
175. See, e.g., Halley et al., supra note 2, at 347-60 (addressing governance feminism 
and sex trafficking in the 1980s and 1990s). 
176. See generally Kapur, supra note 7; Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4; 
supra note 38 and accompanying text. For the perspectives of feminist engagements with 
security studies see, e.g., ANNICK T. R. WIBBEN, FEMINIST SECURITY STUDIES: A NARRATIVE 
APPROACH 84-85 (2011) (arguing of the risk of securitization of areas such as human rights 
through the discourse of human security). Cf. Tripp, supra note 13 (arguing that the framework 
of human security creates openings for feminist contributions).  
177. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 30. 
178. See Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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However, the women, peace, and security, and anti-trafficking 
agendas, have also serviced counter-terrorism and national security 
objectives. For example, for many years in the aftermath of 9/11, the 
dual rise of the women, peace, and security agenda and counter-
terrorism discourse and practice worked hand-in-hand to preference 
the use of a securitized and conflict-based paradigm (as opposed to a 
law enforcement or human rights one) as the core lens through which 
to approach pressing issues in global governance. Such securitization 
and protectionist approaches required and invest heavily in images of 
gendered victimhood,179 which the anti-trafficking and women, peace, 
and security regimes also supplied.180 Securitized approaches to these 
areas have given staying power to images of women as vulnerable 
and requiring of States’ protectionist policies; as such, one core 
outcome of situating women’s rights in a national security framework 
has been a preference for conflict-based (e.g., in the case of women, 
peace, and security) or criminalized (e.g., in the case of trafficking) 
responses to issues of concern to women that primarily emphasize 
their gendered vulnerability (e.g., as victims of trafficking, terrorism, 
and conflict) at the hands of foreign men. To the extent that some 
feminist approaches have then dovetailed with national security 
agendas and utilized gendered images of vulnerability, this confirms 
the propensity of “governance feminism” to promote State-centered, 
law and order, or criminalized responses.181 
Evolutions in contemporary national security practice toward 
more holistic approaches tend to continue these risks of securitization. 
While the exact relationship between counter-terrorism and 
countering violent extremism is not universally accepted (e.g., some 
argue that the latter is a “subset” of counter-terrorism policy and 
practice, others argue that it is an “evolution”)182 it is clear that “CVE 
emerged from and does, for the most part, remain parked—
programmatically and conceptually—in the international and national 
security policymaking community as part of a broader effort to 
counter terrorism.”183 The result is that despite its more holistic 
character and the emphasis on human rights noted above, the field of 
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“very state-centered, top-down” and that it “emphasizes criminal enforcement.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
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CVE it is still, at its core, a security discourse and policy framework 
in which human rights play a secondary and enabling role.184 It is also 
a framework that in many contexts has had a disproportionate focus 
and discriminatory impact on Muslim communities with distinct 
gender and human rights consequences that I explore further below.185   
This securitization of women’s human rights concerns is closely 
accompanied by another, second normative feature of women’s rights 
in the post-9/11 era: the risk of instrumentalization186 and narrowing 
of opportunities to develop and implement gender norms, as well as 
the prospects for inclusive feminist approaches. Such instrumental 
approaches to international law protections—meaning those that 
approach gender norms and women’s rights primarily, or even solely, 
through a lens of countering terrorism or countering violent 
extremism—can undoubtedly be seductive,187 having particular 
salience for those feminist approaches that feared marginalization and 
irrelevancy in the immediate aftermath of the events of 9/11. On one 
level, it is indeed easy to see the appeal in this approach; as well as 
being a tool for keeping women’s rights in the spotlight, it is also true, 
for example, in practice, that many instances of gender equality 
organizing and advocacy by women’s rights organizations and human 
rights defenders—including those working on women, peace, and 
security issues—do contribute upstream to creating the kind of 
resilient, tolerant, and peaceful societies to which contemporary 
national security policy and practice aspire. It may also be the case—
as per the instrumentalist position—that gender equality has a net 
positive effect in countering terrorism and violent extremism.188 
However, it should be noted that strong empirical work on the latter is 
																																																																																																																												
184. See generally Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. 
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13, at 12-13 (noting that the incorporation of women into State-based national security 
strategies risks their being used instrumentally to promote counter-terrorism efforts).  
187.  Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4; Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1116. 
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lacking, and ultimately irrelevant in principle if the promotion of 
international norms on gender equality is seen as an end in and of 
itself rather than a means to the end of countering terrorism and 
violent extremism. 
However, despite these appeals, the trend toward securitization 
and instrumentalization of women’s human rights has, to date, been 
both normatively damaging and disruptive of opportunities for 
effective organizing for women’s rights. In particular, making 
women’s rights of secondary importance in a broader counter-
terrorism or countering violent extremism agenda opens up the 
possibility of bartering down or away women’s rights and gender 
equality when such bartering is perceived to serve national security 
interests—a pattern that already has occurred in some existing 
countering terrorism and violent extremism practice and which 
undermines the inviolability of women’s rights protections.189 The 
risks to the legitimacy and viability of women’s human rights 
advocacy are also acute. For example, women’s rights advocacy that 
becomes “too closely associated” with Western national security 
agendas increases the threat of backlash against women’s rights 
defenders or others seeking to implement gender equality norms. 190 
In addition, framing women’s rights and advocacy as a strategic 
element of national security policy, also means that security actors—
including in many cases discriminatory, undemocratic, and 
unreformed security services—become the key interlocutors on the 
implementation of women’s human rights, almost inevitably to their 
detriment.191 In many cases, such securitized engagement on issues of 
women’s rights takes place in already racially, ethnically, and 
religiously marginalized communities, including those that have been 
previously targeted and adversely affected by counter-terrorism 
policies. Lessons from programs such as those in the United Kingdom 
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The Role of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Sept. 9, 2015).  
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where broad CVE programing sought to explicitly promote the 
engagement of Muslim women indicate that such programing 
increases alienation, discrimination, and harassment against Muslim 
women and creates a concern that the perspectives of minority women 
are only valued as they relate to the achievement of national security 
objectives.192 The rejection of such instrumentalized and securitized 
approaches—including through insisting on clarity on the dividing 
line between women’s rights and women, peace, and security, issues 
on the one hand, and countering violent extremism and terrorism, on 
the other—is a core challenge for feminist approaches to international 
law moving forward.193 
Additionally, efforts to conjoin women’s rights and national 
security, particularly under more holistic approaches that still 
nonetheless retain an overarching security orientation, have also 
sometimes led to a preference for norms outside of binding human 
rights treaty law—e.g., in UN Security Council Resolutions (on 
women, peace, and security) or transnational criminal law (e.g., the 
UN Trafficking Protocol)—as the preferred vanguard for women’s 
rights protections. In part, this turn away from the binding framework 
of international human rights law can be traced to an early distrust in 
a number of feminist accounts of the role of hard legal protections for 
ensuring gender equality. Such feminist accounts of international law 
scrutinized hard and soft law human rights guarantees, canvassing 
gender-neutral law for its gendered character and impacts,194 as well 
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as querying the benefits of siloing women’s rights into specialized 
instruments and institutions, including through a hard law, but highly-
reserved and weak international human rights treaty in the form of the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women.195 This feminist wariness of the importance of hard 
law human rights protections in ensuring women’s rights was 
consolidated by the secondary role accorded to human rights in the 
post-9/11 era: evidenced both in the initial (and in many cases 
ongoing) challenges in getting States to observe human rights in 
countering terrorism and violent extremism (e.g., in detention 
practices), but also in the development of more instrumental 
approaches to human rights in “soft” countering terrorism and violent 
extremism approaches that have a tendency to emphasize human 
rights as a strategic tool rather than hard obligation. As such, efforts 
to conjoin gender issues and national security tend to emphasize the 
intelligence or security value of women’s inclusion and gender 
mainstreaming over those formal legal norms (e.g., non-
discrimination and gender equality) which arguably constitute binding 
treaty obligations for the same outcomes.196 These factors, along with 
the invisibility of States’ violations of women’s human rights in the 
name of countering terrorism described above, are both symptomatic 
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and generative of this decreased attention to the role of hard law 
obligations in protecting women’s rights. 
D. Feminist Methods and Fractured Feminisms 
While the above sections primarily address the normative 
impacts of the post-9/11 environment on gender equality and 
women’s rights, it is also important to make some further 
observations about how that environment has affected the possibilities 
for transnational and inclusive feminist organizing, as well as other 
feminist methods in international law. What stands out in a review of 
this environment is the extent to which there is no single “global 
feminist” or “global feminism” that dominates. While women have 
been notably absent, if not invisible,197 in the trajectory of national 
security policy-making and practice from 9/11 to the present, some 
feminisms—‟international conflict feminism,” abolitionists 
capitalizing on the trafficking-terror nexus, those opposing “Muslim 
fundamentalism,” and to some extent those perspectives advancing 
feminist analyses of women’s engagement in terrorism and violent 
extremism—have had airtime in certain instances and at certain 
junctures. However, to the extent that there has been an involvement 
of such feminisms, it would be very difficult to describe the 
organizational style as “coalitional” or uniform, or evincing an 
identifiable representational practice—another core feature of 
“governance feminism”198—stemming as each does from quite 
different foci and entry points in the terrain of contemporary national 
security practice and policy. Instead, explanations for both the 
engagement and resonance of these perspectives range from the 
intrinsic (e.g., a genuine concern about the real impacts of terrorism 
on women and girls) to the instrumental (e.g., as a strategy of some 
feminist voices concerned about the inattention to women’s rights in 
an era dominated by national security actors and seeking a hook to 
ensure women’s issues remain on the agenda in the altered policy-
making space)—or in some cases, a mixture of the two. These 
perspectives also often mobilize opposite or competing gendered 
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images. For example, for feminists combating “Muslim 
fundamentalism,” a key emphasis has been on portraying terrorism as 
the antithesis of gender equality and, often, stressing the status of 
women as victims.199 Such approaches dovetail neatly with 
governments’ emphasis on the idea of women’s vulnerability and lack 
of agency as a justification for counter-terrorism, particularly on 
behalf of women in the Global South. However, at the same time, 
other perspectives—particularly those analyzing the complex array of 
motivations of women for joining or supporting terrorist and violent 
extremist organizations—can emphasize women’s agency, as well as 
the various roles women play in terrorist organizations. An additional 
layer that complicates a portrait of feminist homogeneity is that often, 
as discussed above, the impetus for women’s inclusion and gender 
mainstreaming has come from national security actors, particularly in 
the context of contemporary security practice.200 This move without 
more is suggestive more of “cooption” than “governance 
feminism.”201 
In addition to differing perspectives amongst these feminisms, 
there has also been a notable absence of a number of key feminists 
and feminism engaging in either the formation or critique of evolving 
practices in countering terrorism and violent extremism from a legal 
perspective, particularly after the initial crisis moment represented by 
the events of 9/11. For some this absence derives from an unease of 
how the feminist project could be used or co-opted to support military 
or more broadly coercive actions.202 In practice, however, the absence 
of a number of feminist voices from national security discourse and 
practice can also in part be attributed to a perceived lack of relevant 
expertise on the topic, particularly when counter-terrorism and 
countering violent extremism was dominated by “hard” security 
measures such as military, law enforcement, and intelligence action. 
The notion of installing feminism as authority which features 
prominently in the “governance feminism” literature—the idea that a 
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key methodology and entry point of feminism has been the 
elaboration of feminism as expertise—simply does not find a parallel 
in the post-9/11 legal and institutional landscape. The result has been 
an array of normative silences in areas that the gaze of feminism 
would have otherwise surfaced. For example, unlike the achievement 
of “governance feminism,” in ensuring international humanitarian law 
and international criminal law explicitly addressed the “distinctive 
harms that women suffer in armed conflict,”203 feminist approaches—
with few exceptions—have been woefully late and inadequate in 
raising the visibility of the gendered effects of State’s counter-
terrorism measures.204 
Additionally, a number of other features of the post-9/11 
environment have fractured the opportunities for transnational and 
inclusive feminist organizing, particularly by reinforcing—and in 
some case creating—hierarchies among different women and 
women’s organizations. In large part, these hierarchies derive from 
the idea of feminism-as-counter-terrorism. The argument that gender 
equality should be deployed as a counter-terrorism tool is at its core 
about Western governments seeking to shore up their own domestic 
security by promoting women’s rights not so much within their own 
territories, but instead, within other States’ domestic jurisdictions. 
Under this approach, the domestic prerogatives of one State are used 
to throw open the “black box”205 of another’s domestic affairs to 
scrutinize deeply local contexts and to assess the potential roles that 
foreign women can play in combating violent extremism. It is within 
this framework, for example, that local women’s organizing on 
confronting oppressive policies within the context of religion,206 
begins to be viewed less as an organic, localized, human rights effort 
and more as a potential part of a broader and structured counter-
terrorism policy to increase the security of the Global North. Such an 
approach reinforces hierarchies amongst women’s rights, because it 
implies that the human rights of foreign women—including 
immigrant women in the West—only matter to the extent that they 
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can be of service to ensuring the security of majority women in 
Western countries.207 
Compounding this splintering are other features of counter-
terrorism practice, in particular anti-terrorism financing rules, which 
have reinforced “top down” approaches to feminist advocacy in the 
post-9/11 era. In particular, counter-terrorism financing rules have 
narrowed the operating space and resources available for small, local 
women’s organizations: such rules, by their nature are gender-
discriminatory and in practice, cut off funding women’s 
organizations.208 In this environment, donors also increasingly prefer 
to “channel funds via large organizations (including consultancies)” 
meaning that “direct access to funding is getting more difficult for 
women’s organizations.”209 In still other cases, the politicization of 
counter-terrorism discourse and practice can mean that those smaller 
women’s organizations that are eligible to receive such grants may 
reject the terms of the grant (such as those requiring extensive due 
diligence on partners) as a matter of principle.210 In addition to having 
to work through bigger organizations, counter-terrorism measures 
have meant that women’s organizations are also often forced to 
engage in an array of adaptive behavior that places great strain on 
their work, including by “[k]eeping a low profile in regards to certain 
activities, or dropping of some programs.”211 Against a backdrop of 
these changes that have been wrought by the national security 
landscape in the long shadow of 9/11, certain feminist methods 
designed to take into account women’s diverse experiences (e.g., 
“world traveling,” that requires “multicultural dialogue and a shared 
																																																																																																																												
207. See generally Cyra Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?: Liberal 
Feminism’s Visions of the “Progress” of Muslim Women, 39 U. BALTIMORE. L. Forum 153, 
153 (2009) (“The last decade and a half has seen a burgeoning of transnational activism on 
behalf of women in the global South. With the continuing wars on terror and in Iraq, Muslim 
women’s oppression and the role of Islam in that oppression remain in the limelight.”). These 
patterns can reinforce already existing hierarchies amongst women. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 
28, at 729 (citations omitted) (arguing that the “fragmentation of women’s human rights law” 
has been a “real boon for educated, middle-class women” and for those in the “global North”). 
208. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
209. Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects on the Implementation of the Women, 
Peace and Security Agenda, supra note 134, at 6. 
210. See A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra 
note 7, at 75. 
211. Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects on the Implementation of the Women, 
Peace and Security Agenda, supra note 134, at 7. 
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search for areas of overlap, shared concerns and values”212) simply 
falter, and the “spread of feminist ideas” shuts down rather than 
facilitates “new spaces for feminist activism.”213 
CONCLUSION: FEMINISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY MOVING FORWARD 
Terrorism, as well as counter-terrorism and countering violent 
extremism, are dominant features of the global landscape in the post-
9/11 era. While there have been some feminist legal analyses of 
States’ national security responses, these tend to primarily address 
9/11 and its immediate aftermath, including the conflicts of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and have neither taken a long view on the 
aftermath of 9/11 nor kept apace with the more holistic approaches to 
countering terrorism and violent extremism that represent 
contemporary national security practice. Instead, the praxis with 
which almost all feminist international law accounts of national 
security have been concerned is the initial landscape of counter-
terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, comprising “hard,” post hoc 
military, law enforcement, and intelligence approaches addressed to 
the pursuit and apprehension of terrorists that privileged traditional 
and coercive security actions and actors. Contemporary national 
security practices that consist of more holistic and “soft” preventive 
measures that target the pre-criminal space and address conditions 
conducive to terrorism such as the dehumanization of victims, as well 
as the promotion of human rights—particularly through a new field of 
policy and activities known as countering violent extremism—have 
hitherto escaped feminist scrutiny. While the events of 9/11 and the 
immediate response were core antecedents for these contemporary 
practices, there are significant developments in the fields of 
countering terrorism and violent extremism of which there is 
insufficient account, particularly vis-à-vis its impact on the 
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development and implementation of international law on gender 
equality. 
The failure to attend to the impact of this broad and evolving 
national security environment on the capacity of international law and 
its institutions to address gender equality has been consequential. It 
has not meant that concepts of gender equality and feminism have not 
been considered within this evolving context, but rather that where 
they have been taken up it is in ways that favor certain feminist 
perspectives—‟international conflict feminism,” abolitionists 
capitalizing on the trafficking-terror nexus, those opposing “Muslim 
fundamentalism,” and to some extent those perspectives advancing 
feminist analyses of women’s engagement in violent extremism—and 
not others, with consequences that are not always favorable to 
women’s rights. From heavy investments in gendered notions of 
women as victims of terrorism to the promotion of women’s 
participation in national security in ways that deploy a series of 
troubling gender stereotypes to the securitization and 
instrumentalization of gender equality itself as a counter-terrorism 
measure, the prospects for progressive feminist approaches to 
international law have been markedly narrowed. Compounding these 
effects that have flowed from national security’s uptake of women 
and gender equality are other normative consequences of this 
evolving and broadened national security landscape, including how a 
post-9/11 revival of international law’s formalism has reduced the 
discipline’s capacity to develop gender equality norms and to address 
State-based violations against women, while at the same time 
inculcating a steady preference for soft rather than hard, treaty law 
protections for women’s rights. Against this backdrop and in the 
current grey area that exists between “governance feminism” and 
feminism governed, the need for transnational and genuinely 
inclusive feminist organizing is particularly acute. At the same time, 
however, several features of the post-9/11 era—particularly the 
gender-discriminatory impacts of counter-terrorism financing rules—
mitigate against such approaches. As such, this Article seeks to 
provide a starting point to inform an ongoing examination of 
feminism and international law in the post-9/11 era in ways that fully 
contemplate the future normative and political capacity of 
international law and international institutions to address gender 
equality. 
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With regard to developing that framework moving forward, this 
Article’s examination of contemporary national security policy and 
practice demonstrates that the task of seeing women, and more 
broadly gender, reveals itself to be a much more complicated 
undertaking than only looking at women as victims of male terrorist 
violence or lamenting their absence in security decision-making. 
Instead, a feminist project or projects that seek to make gender 
concerns visible in the current national security context must consider 
at least four separate aspects as well as how each of these areas relate 
to each other: the human rights and gender issues at stake in women’s 
engagement in and support of terrorism; the impact of terrorism and 
violent extremism on women and girls and gender equality; the roles 
of women and gender equality in countering terrorism and violent 
extremism, including through women’s participation in security 
institutions; and the impact of counter-terrorism and countering 
violent extremism on women and girls. The last fourteen years in 
particular have been beset by feminist failures to authentically address 
these and other intersections of women’s rights issues with terrorism 
and efforts at fighting its occurrence. These failures range from the 
continued impunity for terrorists who directly and differently target 
women and girls’ security in conflict and post-conflict settings to 
failure to adopt gender-sensitive disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration programs for females involved in terrorism and violent 
extremism to gender-based abuses in the name of national security 
that frustrate the full implementation of the gender equality agenda. 
In addressing such effects moving forward, it will be as 
important not to overstate how much countering violent extremism 
and terrorism is of concern to the women, peace, and security agenda 
and gender equality, and vice versa, as it will be to not downplay the 
overlaps. From insisting on clarity on the dividing line between the 
fields of countering violent extremism and women’s rights advocacy 
to developing gender-sensitive prevention and response frameworks 
without unduly trading in images of women’s vulnerability and 
victimhood, feminist approaches to international law in the post-9/11 
era face a pressing challenge not just of ensuring women’s rights are 
protected from incursion by either terrorists or State actors, but that 
women and the gender equality agenda more broadly are not squeezed 
between terror and counter-terror. 
